1. Behaving as if deontology is true, on the object level: following RIGHTS and related norms
2. Behaving as if deontology is true, on the meta level: saying the kinds of things a deontologist would say (things like "we have non-instrumental reasons to follow RIGHTS")
My guess is you mean for deontic fictionalism to refer to just (1)?
(a) Following RIGHTS and related norms as part of a deontological pretense (rather than for directly utilitarian reasons)
(b) Additionally affirming deontological verdicts about moral wrongness (even about hypothetical cases where it diverges from utilitarianism), as part of the pretense; and
(c) Additionally affirming deontological theoretical claims, e.g. about non-instrumental reasons to follow RIGHTS, as part of the pretense.
I had in mind mostly (a) and maybe (b). Stopping at (b) seems coherent enough if one specifies that the relevant sense of "wrongness" isn't necessarily normatively authoritative (though one acts as though it is). I guess this is basically just your (1), supplemented with *some* deontologically-flavoured talk, but talk that can easily be given a true interpretation. (One speaks of "wrong" in an internal sense, i.e. "according to the deontology-system", not "wrong" in the philosopher's reason-implying sense, external to any given system of norms.)
Going all the way to (c) would seem to increase the risk of confusion/miscommunication, with not much practical upside that I can see?
(I'm assuming that "reason"-talk is most naturally given an external/authoritative reading, whereas "morally wrong" can naturally be given either "internal" or "external" readings. If others' linguistic intuitions differ, they might prefer to use different terms to mark my intended distinction between levels (b) and (c).)
I agree with the view you present here, but I think the best arguments in favour of self-effacing consequentialism are psychological and sociological, not directly philosophical. Are we (individually or collectively) capable of adhering to a norm if we regard it as only instrumental? Are we capable of behaving _as if_ a theory is true, without believing in it?
I think arguments along these lines can be overstated, but they're at least not crazy, and I think to be fully convincing you have to address to what extent our (again, individually or collectively) capacity to be "deontic fictionalists" is a real practical difficulty to be overcome.
Moreover, I think you rightly emphasize deontic fictionalism as a sort of middle-ground position, ("training wheels") that is a little unstable--but for people who worry that real prudent two-level consequentialism is too hard to maintain (if we know the norms are instrumental, it will always be easy to find instrumental reasons to discard them in particular cases), that very instability is a problem. If position 1 isn't psychologically or socially feasible, and if position 2 is just the training wheels version of 1, then that strengthens the case for 3.
"Much confusion in moral theory stems from people conflating the practical question of whether to endorse a norm against X with the theoretical question of whether agents have non-instrumental reason to avoid doing X. These are different questions!"
I think saying this sort of thing is perceived by deontologists as condescending, and is likely to make them stop reading when they see it. No, they're not conflating anything; they just believe in the non-instrumental reason.
Having gotten to know multiple good philosophy profs of different ethical viewpoints, it was pretty clear to me that several of them regarded the viewpoints of the others as not even worth thinking about (and vice versa) since they thought they didn't understand some basic thing like this.
Certainly some really believe in the non-instrumental reason. Others -- esp. non-philosophers interested in ethics -- may be more concerned about the practical norms. Obviously this post is addressed to the latter group!
Can you comment on the distinction between
1. Behaving as if deontology is true, on the object level: following RIGHTS and related norms
2. Behaving as if deontology is true, on the meta level: saying the kinds of things a deontologist would say (things like "we have non-instrumental reasons to follow RIGHTS")
My guess is you mean for deontic fictionalism to refer to just (1)?
I'd maybe opt for a three-level distinction:
(a) Following RIGHTS and related norms as part of a deontological pretense (rather than for directly utilitarian reasons)
(b) Additionally affirming deontological verdicts about moral wrongness (even about hypothetical cases where it diverges from utilitarianism), as part of the pretense; and
(c) Additionally affirming deontological theoretical claims, e.g. about non-instrumental reasons to follow RIGHTS, as part of the pretense.
I had in mind mostly (a) and maybe (b). Stopping at (b) seems coherent enough if one specifies that the relevant sense of "wrongness" isn't necessarily normatively authoritative (though one acts as though it is). I guess this is basically just your (1), supplemented with *some* deontologically-flavoured talk, but talk that can easily be given a true interpretation. (One speaks of "wrong" in an internal sense, i.e. "according to the deontology-system", not "wrong" in the philosopher's reason-implying sense, external to any given system of norms.)
Going all the way to (c) would seem to increase the risk of confusion/miscommunication, with not much practical upside that I can see?
(I'm assuming that "reason"-talk is most naturally given an external/authoritative reading, whereas "morally wrong" can naturally be given either "internal" or "external" readings. If others' linguistic intuitions differ, they might prefer to use different terms to mark my intended distinction between levels (b) and (c).)
I agree with the view you present here, but I think the best arguments in favour of self-effacing consequentialism are psychological and sociological, not directly philosophical. Are we (individually or collectively) capable of adhering to a norm if we regard it as only instrumental? Are we capable of behaving _as if_ a theory is true, without believing in it?
I think arguments along these lines can be overstated, but they're at least not crazy, and I think to be fully convincing you have to address to what extent our (again, individually or collectively) capacity to be "deontic fictionalists" is a real practical difficulty to be overcome.
Moreover, I think you rightly emphasize deontic fictionalism as a sort of middle-ground position, ("training wheels") that is a little unstable--but for people who worry that real prudent two-level consequentialism is too hard to maintain (if we know the norms are instrumental, it will always be easy to find instrumental reasons to discard them in particular cases), that very instability is a problem. If position 1 isn't psychologically or socially feasible, and if position 2 is just the training wheels version of 1, then that strengthens the case for 3.
"Much confusion in moral theory stems from people conflating the practical question of whether to endorse a norm against X with the theoretical question of whether agents have non-instrumental reason to avoid doing X. These are different questions!"
I think saying this sort of thing is perceived by deontologists as condescending, and is likely to make them stop reading when they see it. No, they're not conflating anything; they just believe in the non-instrumental reason.
Having gotten to know multiple good philosophy profs of different ethical viewpoints, it was pretty clear to me that several of them regarded the viewpoints of the others as not even worth thinking about (and vice versa) since they thought they didn't understand some basic thing like this.
Certainly some really believe in the non-instrumental reason. Others -- esp. non-philosophers interested in ethics -- may be more concerned about the practical norms. Obviously this post is addressed to the latter group!