You claim that, for the rationalist, "[there] is no all-things-considered practical error involved in prioritizing your self-interest. Accordingly, there is nothing especially correct—or all-things-considered normatively better—about prioritizing the child’s life." I think that rationalists ought only agree to the first claim, …
You claim that, for the rationalist, "[there] is no all-things-considered practical error involved in prioritizing your self-interest. Accordingly, there is nothing especially correct—or all-things-considered normatively better—about prioritizing the child’s life." I think that rationalists ought only agree to the first claim, and deny that the second claim follows.
For someone who accepts both these claims, saving the child only better in the sense of being 'morally better', but this is symmetric to the 'non-moral betterness' of taking the vacation, and it is the fact that the moral and non-moral values here are at least roughly in balance that makes both options permissible. But rationalists need not believe that the only way for two options to both be permissible is for them to be (roughly) equally good. Thus it might be that saving the child is much better all-things-considered, but some other considerations make taking the vacation rationally comparable. (I don't know if these other considerations have to be 'prerogatives' or if garden-variety reasons will do.) That is, I think rationalists can say that saving the child is best but not rationally superior.
I assume you'll want to resist this, but I'm not sure exactly how. In particular, it would be helpful to know if you think your reasons for resisting are ones which would only be compelling if one was already sympathetic to consequentialism, or if there are more ecumenical motivations in play here.
Hi Jeremy, I mean "better" as in "better decision", not "producing of a higher-value outcome"! Since non-consequentialists care about things other than value, they will take better decisions to come apart from value-promoting ones.
That said, there is a general puzzle about what you could possibly mean by claiming that it is "better all-things-considered", and yet *not* rationally superior, to save the child. (I understand claiming that it is more productive of impartial value and yet not rationally superior. But it would seem a bit odd to identify impartial value with *all-things-considered* betterness, if you think it doesn't actually incorporate all the normative reasons - considerations - that there are!)
Thank you, that's helpful. I agree that the best decision must be the one most strongly supported by reasons. (Indeed, if 'best decision' doesn't mean 'decision that produces the most value' it's hard to see what else it could mean.) Therefore, if the ought of most reason is the (fundamental? most central?) ought of rationality, then yes, the best decision must be rationally superior. What I am thinking is that a rationalist may resist by denying that the ought of rationality is the ought of most reason. Instead, they will claim that the most important deontic rational notion is permissibility (in the lax sense you are describing), and you rationally ought F just when F is your only permissible option. On this view rationality doesn't enjoin us to do what is best, but rather only to meet some lower standard; the point of rational guidance is not to lead us to do the best, but only not to do so badly as to fall below the bar of permissibility.
I am not sympathetic to this view. I accept, as I think you do, that the ought of rationality is the all-things-considered ought, and I find it hard to imagine how something could be the best decision yet not be what I, all things considered, ought to do. But unless you think its definitive of the ought of rationality that it is the all-things-considered ought, or something similar, there seems to be space for the view I describe. And I think that would be the most plausible version of a 'rationalist' view of permissibility in your lax sense.
Hi Richard
You claim that, for the rationalist, "[there] is no all-things-considered practical error involved in prioritizing your self-interest. Accordingly, there is nothing especially correct—or all-things-considered normatively better—about prioritizing the child’s life." I think that rationalists ought only agree to the first claim, and deny that the second claim follows.
For someone who accepts both these claims, saving the child only better in the sense of being 'morally better', but this is symmetric to the 'non-moral betterness' of taking the vacation, and it is the fact that the moral and non-moral values here are at least roughly in balance that makes both options permissible. But rationalists need not believe that the only way for two options to both be permissible is for them to be (roughly) equally good. Thus it might be that saving the child is much better all-things-considered, but some other considerations make taking the vacation rationally comparable. (I don't know if these other considerations have to be 'prerogatives' or if garden-variety reasons will do.) That is, I think rationalists can say that saving the child is best but not rationally superior.
I assume you'll want to resist this, but I'm not sure exactly how. In particular, it would be helpful to know if you think your reasons for resisting are ones which would only be compelling if one was already sympathetic to consequentialism, or if there are more ecumenical motivations in play here.
Hi Jeremy, I mean "better" as in "better decision", not "producing of a higher-value outcome"! Since non-consequentialists care about things other than value, they will take better decisions to come apart from value-promoting ones.
That said, there is a general puzzle about what you could possibly mean by claiming that it is "better all-things-considered", and yet *not* rationally superior, to save the child. (I understand claiming that it is more productive of impartial value and yet not rationally superior. But it would seem a bit odd to identify impartial value with *all-things-considered* betterness, if you think it doesn't actually incorporate all the normative reasons - considerations - that there are!)
Thank you, that's helpful. I agree that the best decision must be the one most strongly supported by reasons. (Indeed, if 'best decision' doesn't mean 'decision that produces the most value' it's hard to see what else it could mean.) Therefore, if the ought of most reason is the (fundamental? most central?) ought of rationality, then yes, the best decision must be rationally superior. What I am thinking is that a rationalist may resist by denying that the ought of rationality is the ought of most reason. Instead, they will claim that the most important deontic rational notion is permissibility (in the lax sense you are describing), and you rationally ought F just when F is your only permissible option. On this view rationality doesn't enjoin us to do what is best, but rather only to meet some lower standard; the point of rational guidance is not to lead us to do the best, but only not to do so badly as to fall below the bar of permissibility.
I am not sympathetic to this view. I accept, as I think you do, that the ought of rationality is the all-things-considered ought, and I find it hard to imagine how something could be the best decision yet not be what I, all things considered, ought to do. But unless you think its definitive of the ought of rationality that it is the all-things-considered ought, or something similar, there seems to be space for the view I describe. And I think that would be the most plausible version of a 'rationalist' view of permissibility in your lax sense.