Might it be good to include something on the "exploitability" objection? This seems to be behind much of right-wing deontology's emphasis on vengeance/retribution.
Gustafsson's article "Bentham's Mugging" describes one aspect of this (linked below). But I assume it has been discussed a fair amount in philosophy of criminal law and ethics of war.
With the commitment abilities allowed by computers/AI, these things get more complex and people like Caspar Oesterheld are doing interesting work that may be relevant.
I am curious having read a bit of what you have liked to why you are interested in follow-on work around pronatalism and not about antinatalism? Either can certainly be analyzed and likely justified using consequentialist methods.
So it's partly just a judgment call about what's worth exploring further in light of those arguments.
I also think there's an especially interesting further question of what "real-world population ethics" looks like for one who accepts a more classically utilitarian stance on which additional good lives count as good -- especially in light of the fertility crisis, as more and more of the world's populations fall into "below replacement" patterns. There seems more to explore there that hasn't already been covered by our existing content.
Might it be good to include something on the "exploitability" objection? This seems to be behind much of right-wing deontology's emphasis on vengeance/retribution.
Gustafsson's article "Bentham's Mugging" describes one aspect of this (linked below). But I assume it has been discussed a fair amount in philosophy of criminal law and ethics of war.
With the commitment abilities allowed by computers/AI, these things get more complex and people like Caspar Oesterheld are doing interesting work that may be relevant.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/9C67002F344B20661A6C35C960F25A86/S0953820822000218a.pdf/benthams_mugging.pdf
I am curious having read a bit of what you have liked to why you are interested in follow-on work around pronatalism and not about antinatalism? Either can certainly be analyzed and likely justified using consequentialist methods.
Antinatalism tends to assume a strong procreative asymmetry, which we already discuss in our population ethics chapter:
https://www.utilitarianism.net/population-ethics/#person-affecting-views-and-the-procreative-asymmetry
So it's partly just a judgment call about what's worth exploring further in light of those arguments.
I also think there's an especially interesting further question of what "real-world population ethics" looks like for one who accepts a more classically utilitarian stance on which additional good lives count as good -- especially in light of the fertility crisis, as more and more of the world's populations fall into "below replacement" patterns. There seems more to explore there that hasn't already been covered by our existing content.