Can't really understand your defence of utilitarianism on replaceability. Utilitarianism is the practice of cardinalizing mental states. I don't understand how saying that there is a genuine tradeoff denies that.
A trivial implication of cardinality is additivity and a trivial implication of additivity is replaceability, this is like sayi…
Can't really understand your defence of utilitarianism on replaceability. Utilitarianism is the practice of cardinalizing mental states. I don't understand how saying that there is a genuine tradeoff denies that.
A trivial implication of cardinality is additivity and a trivial implication of additivity is replaceability, this is like saying that 2+3 can be replaced by 1+4.
Do you explain what your kind of utilitarianism is somewhere?
I deny that additivity implies fungibility. Two goods of value 2 and 3 could be replaced with distinct goods of value 1 and 4, and the result would be *equally good* (worth choosing), but it's a further question whether the tradeoff is a matter of indifference (as between fungible goods) or of ambivalence (if you have *different reasons*, of equal weight, to regret either loss). I explain this view further in my paper 'Value Receptacles', linked in the OP.
Can't really understand your defence of utilitarianism on replaceability. Utilitarianism is the practice of cardinalizing mental states. I don't understand how saying that there is a genuine tradeoff denies that.
A trivial implication of cardinality is additivity and a trivial implication of additivity is replaceability, this is like saying that 2+3 can be replaced by 1+4.
Do you explain what your kind of utilitarianism is somewhere?
Sure, see: https://www.utilitarianism.net/introduction-to-utilitarianism/#what-is-utilitarianism
I deny that additivity implies fungibility. Two goods of value 2 and 3 could be replaced with distinct goods of value 1 and 4, and the result would be *equally good* (worth choosing), but it's a further question whether the tradeoff is a matter of indifference (as between fungible goods) or of ambivalence (if you have *different reasons*, of equal weight, to regret either loss). I explain this view further in my paper 'Value Receptacles', linked in the OP.