I'm a layperson (non-academic), and my thoughts might not be fully well-reasoned here, but I think that you make the case here very strongly for the attitudinal view and against the hybrid view. It does seem obvious to me that any ethical consideration should be considered from the post-facto perspective. So I agree th…
I'm a layperson (non-academic), and my thoughts might not be fully well-reasoned here, but I think that you make the case here very strongly for the attitudinal view and against the hybrid view. It does seem obvious to me that any ethical consideration should be considered from the post-facto perspective. So I agree that the personal reasons not to kill Bob must be weiged in light of the post-facto state of the world in which Sally exists. In that world there are equally strong personal reasons to want Sally to exist, thus negating the hybrid view.
I would go so far as to offer that your argument in favor of the attitudinal position effectively undermines the distinction you make in this other blog post you cited (https://rychappell.substack.com/p/killing-vs-failing-to-create) between personal and impersonal differences in killing vs. creating people. If ethical considerations must be considered from the post facto-perspective, creating people is equally as personal as killing people. You gave the example there of saving children from malaria vs promoting the conception of children. I have some doubt about whether these are indeed comparably equal welfarist goods (i.e. as there is also cost in creating and raising the not-yet-conceived children to the equivalent health and mental wellbeing of the existing children, and that cost imbalances the eqiuvalency IMO), but, assuming that they are equivalent, then the argument you make here I think would undermine the assertion you make there that it is better to save children from malaria than to promote the creation of new ones. Does that make sense?
I would furthermore say that given your argument here, the entire distinction between the personal and impersonal falls away and can be discarded since the impersonal will always, post facto, be personal.
I don't find it entirely "obvious" that the post-facto perspective trumps. (Isn't there something important about the normative perspective / standard that applies *at the moment of decision*? And see the final footnote for cases where the post facto perspective might seem outright misleading.)
But it at least seems like a reasonable perspective to take, and I agree that (insofar as that's right) it could limit the significance of the killing/non-creation distinction.
Thank you for this!
I'm a layperson (non-academic), and my thoughts might not be fully well-reasoned here, but I think that you make the case here very strongly for the attitudinal view and against the hybrid view. It does seem obvious to me that any ethical consideration should be considered from the post-facto perspective. So I agree that the personal reasons not to kill Bob must be weiged in light of the post-facto state of the world in which Sally exists. In that world there are equally strong personal reasons to want Sally to exist, thus negating the hybrid view.
I would go so far as to offer that your argument in favor of the attitudinal position effectively undermines the distinction you make in this other blog post you cited (https://rychappell.substack.com/p/killing-vs-failing-to-create) between personal and impersonal differences in killing vs. creating people. If ethical considerations must be considered from the post facto-perspective, creating people is equally as personal as killing people. You gave the example there of saving children from malaria vs promoting the conception of children. I have some doubt about whether these are indeed comparably equal welfarist goods (i.e. as there is also cost in creating and raising the not-yet-conceived children to the equivalent health and mental wellbeing of the existing children, and that cost imbalances the eqiuvalency IMO), but, assuming that they are equivalent, then the argument you make here I think would undermine the assertion you make there that it is better to save children from malaria than to promote the creation of new ones. Does that make sense?
I would furthermore say that given your argument here, the entire distinction between the personal and impersonal falls away and can be discarded since the impersonal will always, post facto, be personal.
I don't find it entirely "obvious" that the post-facto perspective trumps. (Isn't there something important about the normative perspective / standard that applies *at the moment of decision*? And see the final footnote for cases where the post facto perspective might seem outright misleading.)
But it at least seems like a reasonable perspective to take, and I agree that (insofar as that's right) it could limit the significance of the killing/non-creation distinction.