In my view often individuals are obviously replaceable: a fertilized egg or embryo has never been conscious is obviously replaceable.
Additionally, while animal suffering is commensurate with human, human life is massively more important. We are far more intertemporal than animals: we have plans and narratives that span for years. Our fea…
In my view often individuals are obviously replaceable: a fertilized egg or embryo has never been conscious is obviously replaceable.
Additionally, while animal suffering is commensurate with human, human life is massively more important. We are far more intertemporal than animals: we have plans and narratives that span for years. Our fear of death is more persistent, our imagination of death more intense (so any regime of “high repleceability affects more our current welfare).
Yeah, I like the point that there are significant practical reasons to oppose a "regime of high replaceability" for people. That could partly explain why we're inclined to treat death as a much bigger deal than non-creation. But it would be surprising & very revisionary for that to be the *full* story.
I also agree with your verdict about non-conscious embryos. Though I'd say that's because it isn't yet an "individual" (in the morally relevant sense) at all. Moral individuals are mental beings, not biological ones, as per the psychological view of personal identity. (An individual lacking psychological continuity does not mentally persist through time, and so is effectively "replaced" every moment.)
In my view often individuals are obviously replaceable: a fertilized egg or embryo has never been conscious is obviously replaceable.
Additionally, while animal suffering is commensurate with human, human life is massively more important. We are far more intertemporal than animals: we have plans and narratives that span for years. Our fear of death is more persistent, our imagination of death more intense (so any regime of “high repleceability affects more our current welfare).
Yeah, I like the point that there are significant practical reasons to oppose a "regime of high replaceability" for people. That could partly explain why we're inclined to treat death as a much bigger deal than non-creation. But it would be surprising & very revisionary for that to be the *full* story.
I also agree with your verdict about non-conscious embryos. Though I'd say that's because it isn't yet an "individual" (in the morally relevant sense) at all. Moral individuals are mental beings, not biological ones, as per the psychological view of personal identity. (An individual lacking psychological continuity does not mentally persist through time, and so is effectively "replaced" every moment.)