I like Tucker's paper! Two main points of disagreement:
(1) His objection to my view, in section 2, rests on an appeal to tracking counterfactuals: "Counterfactual reasoning reveals that maximizing the good is the proportional explanation."
This mistakenly assumes that all right acts must be right for the same (normative) reason. We shouldn't assume that. Suppose that saving either of two people (when you can't save both) would equally well maximize the good. So either act is equally permissible. Still, it seems open to the consequentialist to claim that the acts are importantly distinct: right for different reasons, and each admitting of pro tanto reasons to regret not choosing the other.
So I don't think he has identified any reason to reject my account of right-making features.
(2) I found the argument of section 3 (Against Fittingness) hard to follow. The challenge for Tucker is how to accommodate the intuition that there's something morally mistaken about *desiring that others suffer* even if the desire has (purely) good effects. I say that the desire's *content* fails to fit with the facts about what is truly good & desirable. Tucker seems to agree: "We get it wrong when we have this desire, because we think something deeply false about morality." But then he adds, confusingly, "This thought is not unfitting, it is merely false."
I would love to see your response to Miles Tucker's value first view - https://philpapers.org/rec/TUCCAO
Neil Sinhababu also believes in value first view.
I like Tucker's paper! Two main points of disagreement:
(1) His objection to my view, in section 2, rests on an appeal to tracking counterfactuals: "Counterfactual reasoning reveals that maximizing the good is the proportional explanation."
This mistakenly assumes that all right acts must be right for the same (normative) reason. We shouldn't assume that. Suppose that saving either of two people (when you can't save both) would equally well maximize the good. So either act is equally permissible. Still, it seems open to the consequentialist to claim that the acts are importantly distinct: right for different reasons, and each admitting of pro tanto reasons to regret not choosing the other.
So I don't think he has identified any reason to reject my account of right-making features.
(2) I found the argument of section 3 (Against Fittingness) hard to follow. The challenge for Tucker is how to accommodate the intuition that there's something morally mistaken about *desiring that others suffer* even if the desire has (purely) good effects. I say that the desire's *content* fails to fit with the facts about what is truly good & desirable. Tucker seems to agree: "We get it wrong when we have this desire, because we think something deeply false about morality." But then he adds, confusingly, "This thought is not unfitting, it is merely false."
But that's just what it is for an attitude to be unfitting: for its implicit normative claims to be false. Compare: https://www.philosophyetc.net/2008/05/claims-of-emotion.html