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Peter Gerdes's avatar

Fair, but I guess I'm trying to understand why you can't then seperate the experiences and the reasoning.

I suspect you would agree that some hypothetical agent who didn't have any feelings or intuitions of this kind wouldn't in fact come to these conclusions. Or are you suggesting that you can, a la Kant, derive them from pure logic alone?

Basically I'm a bit confused about how you understand the evidential/epistemic status of moral sentiments as an addition to pure logical consequence of is your notion of rationality much broader than that?

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Richard Y Chappell's avatar

Much broader notion of rationality! Logically coherent agents include Future-Tuesday indifference, counter-inductivists, and ideally coherent Caligulas who value torture for its own sake. I think they're all objectively misguided ("irrational"). Mere coherence is no guarantee of substantive rationality.

More on my moral epistemology here: https://philpapers.org/rec/CHAKWM

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Peter Gerdes's avatar

Ok thanks that helps alot

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