Note that nothing is either good or bad for those who *don't* exist. So if you grant that some things are good for those who exist, that's everything that *can* be granted as far as the existence of benefits is concerned.
The further moral question is when we should *care* about benefiting someone. My view is that we should *always* want to provide benefits to innocent subjects (insofar as we're able). Your view seems to be that, although Joy's life would be wonderful for her, this gives you no moral reason whatsoever to want this positive outcome to actually eventuate.
I'm trying to better understand this (because what you claim to be "intuitive" is utterly alien to me). Suppose you believe that Joy exists while watching the movie reel of her life. How do you feel about her existence? Like, suppose someone tells you that Joy was *almost* prevented from coming into existence. Would you feel relieved that this obstacle was overcome? Or indifferent? If someone tells you they would (if they could) go back in time to restore the obstacle and prevent her existence, would you be horrified? Or indifferent?
I'm hoping you're not indifferent in those cases (you agree that *that* would be objectionably nihilistic, right?). But now suppose you learn that you're mistaken about the date: actually, Joy has not been conceived yet. So you could actually firm up the obstacle and prevent her from ever coming to exist. Do you suddenly switch to feeling indifferent towards that prospect, and see *no reason at all* to want the happy future you saw to come to fruition? You think that's the "intuitive" verdict / reaction to have about this case?
(P.S. I'm not going to pursue the "package deal" tangent here because the core dispute doesn't hang on it in any way. Lots of people have prioritarian intuitions that I don't especially share, but giving extra weight to averting bads is still compatible with thinking that we always have *some* reason to want good lives to exist.)
My thought was just that it would seem *odd* for one's attitudes towards Joy's life to radically switch back and forth in the described way. As I reported in closing footnote, it doesn't seem to me that our attitude here should depend on where we are in time.
> "I don't see how that [near-prevention] would make a difference"
I don't see how this relates to the dialectic. I asked a question: "Would you feel relieved that this obstacle was overcome? Or indifferent?" The point of the thought-experiment is just to make *vivid* the unconditional value of Joy's life, and the moral loss involved in replacing it with nothing. (Of course the value of her life does not change depending on whether or not it was almost prevented.)
When we reflect on how *different* people easily could have come into existence, I think we should feel a kind of ambivalence. To see this, imagine that we could vividly apprehend all the future possibilities. All else equal, we should have some desire that GoodLife1 be realized, and a roughly comparable desire that GoodLife2 instead be realized, and so on. But we should unambiguously prefer the disjunct of any good life over no life at all. (And, of course, prefer no life at all over any bad life.)
> "I see no philosophical problem with that horrorlessness."
Sure, as I mentioned in the footnote, I see it as akin to denying that wild animal suffering matters. Someone could consistently hold such a view, and in that sense see "no philosophical problem" with it. But it strikes me as (very) morally bad, and I hope my thought experiments can help at least *some* readers to see why. (In general, vividly imagining & focusing on an excluded interest seems like the best hope for helping someone to see why it's morally problematic to neglect that interest.) If you don't share my core intuition, there's probably not much more to discuss here: we've reached argumentative bedrock.
You explained why you disagree; that's fine, but is not the same as "demonstrating problems". The latter would require presenting reasons that anyone ought to recognize as *good* reasons. I think you're rejecting my arguments for bad reasons. (You disagree. Again, that's fine.)
> "Here is a case where I think your view is intuitively mistaken and (very) morally bad..."
No, that's clearly a bad argument. You can substitute *any* moderate benefit (e.g. feeding hungry mice) and it will seem intuitively wrong for the medical team to ignore the urgent needs of the burn victim merely in order to bring about a bunch more of the other good (making mice happy). You *obviously* can't conclude from this that there is nothing good about moderate benefits (whether to hungry mice, or to future people who would otherwise not get to exist).
> "To my mind your view is on untested ground, not known bedrock."
That's an odd claim. You're not really in any position to know how thoroughly my views here have been tested (by prior reflection). My judgment of the dialectic remains that neither of us is likely to convince the other.
I'm pointing to (suspected) underlying "bedrock disagreements" as explanation for why I'm not inclined to invest more time into this discussion. Obviously I haven't *in this discussion* explained all of my views, why I'm unconvinced by your responses and objections, and everything else that I think is wrong with what you've written. That would take a lot of time, and I'm skeptical that it would achieve anything.
My arguments are intended for receptive audiences: the film reel case, for example, might help some to see things more as I do (even when they previously hadn't thought so). But if it doesn't work for you, then it's not for you. Premises may always be rejected; no argument can persuade everyone.
Again, you're under the misapprehension that *what you've read here* is the full extent of my thoughts on the topic. It isn't. Your objections aren't new to me, and I'm under no obligation to go through the motions of a tedious discussion with you just because you (seemingly) want it. Your assumption that this makes me a "fanatic", or indeed that there's *anything* "dishonest" about this, is ludicrous.
I'm going to give you a temporary ban so you can cool off and reflect. Please don't comment on my blog again until you understand (i) that you're not *entitled* to my time, and (ii) that you can't see inside my head, and so you actually have no idea what I've already considered at length. If you repeat these mistakes again in future, the ban will be made permanent.
Note that nothing is either good or bad for those who *don't* exist. So if you grant that some things are good for those who exist, that's everything that *can* be granted as far as the existence of benefits is concerned.
The further moral question is when we should *care* about benefiting someone. My view is that we should *always* want to provide benefits to innocent subjects (insofar as we're able). Your view seems to be that, although Joy's life would be wonderful for her, this gives you no moral reason whatsoever to want this positive outcome to actually eventuate.
I'm trying to better understand this (because what you claim to be "intuitive" is utterly alien to me). Suppose you believe that Joy exists while watching the movie reel of her life. How do you feel about her existence? Like, suppose someone tells you that Joy was *almost* prevented from coming into existence. Would you feel relieved that this obstacle was overcome? Or indifferent? If someone tells you they would (if they could) go back in time to restore the obstacle and prevent her existence, would you be horrified? Or indifferent?
I'm hoping you're not indifferent in those cases (you agree that *that* would be objectionably nihilistic, right?). But now suppose you learn that you're mistaken about the date: actually, Joy has not been conceived yet. So you could actually firm up the obstacle and prevent her from ever coming to exist. Do you suddenly switch to feeling indifferent towards that prospect, and see *no reason at all* to want the happy future you saw to come to fruition? You think that's the "intuitive" verdict / reaction to have about this case?
(P.S. I'm not going to pursue the "package deal" tangent here because the core dispute doesn't hang on it in any way. Lots of people have prioritarian intuitions that I don't especially share, but giving extra weight to averting bads is still compatible with thinking that we always have *some* reason to want good lives to exist.)
My thought was just that it would seem *odd* for one's attitudes towards Joy's life to radically switch back and forth in the described way. As I reported in closing footnote, it doesn't seem to me that our attitude here should depend on where we are in time.
> "I don't see how that [near-prevention] would make a difference"
I don't see how this relates to the dialectic. I asked a question: "Would you feel relieved that this obstacle was overcome? Or indifferent?" The point of the thought-experiment is just to make *vivid* the unconditional value of Joy's life, and the moral loss involved in replacing it with nothing. (Of course the value of her life does not change depending on whether or not it was almost prevented.)
When we reflect on how *different* people easily could have come into existence, I think we should feel a kind of ambivalence. To see this, imagine that we could vividly apprehend all the future possibilities. All else equal, we should have some desire that GoodLife1 be realized, and a roughly comparable desire that GoodLife2 instead be realized, and so on. But we should unambiguously prefer the disjunct of any good life over no life at all. (And, of course, prefer no life at all over any bad life.)
> "I see no philosophical problem with that horrorlessness."
Sure, as I mentioned in the footnote, I see it as akin to denying that wild animal suffering matters. Someone could consistently hold such a view, and in that sense see "no philosophical problem" with it. But it strikes me as (very) morally bad, and I hope my thought experiments can help at least *some* readers to see why. (In general, vividly imagining & focusing on an excluded interest seems like the best hope for helping someone to see why it's morally problematic to neglect that interest.) If you don't share my core intuition, there's probably not much more to discuss here: we've reached argumentative bedrock.
You explained why you disagree; that's fine, but is not the same as "demonstrating problems". The latter would require presenting reasons that anyone ought to recognize as *good* reasons. I think you're rejecting my arguments for bad reasons. (You disagree. Again, that's fine.)
> "Here is a case where I think your view is intuitively mistaken and (very) morally bad..."
No, that's clearly a bad argument. You can substitute *any* moderate benefit (e.g. feeding hungry mice) and it will seem intuitively wrong for the medical team to ignore the urgent needs of the burn victim merely in order to bring about a bunch more of the other good (making mice happy). You *obviously* can't conclude from this that there is nothing good about moderate benefits (whether to hungry mice, or to future people who would otherwise not get to exist).
> "To my mind your view is on untested ground, not known bedrock."
That's an odd claim. You're not really in any position to know how thoroughly my views here have been tested (by prior reflection). My judgment of the dialectic remains that neither of us is likely to convince the other.
I'm pointing to (suspected) underlying "bedrock disagreements" as explanation for why I'm not inclined to invest more time into this discussion. Obviously I haven't *in this discussion* explained all of my views, why I'm unconvinced by your responses and objections, and everything else that I think is wrong with what you've written. That would take a lot of time, and I'm skeptical that it would achieve anything.
My arguments are intended for receptive audiences: the film reel case, for example, might help some to see things more as I do (even when they previously hadn't thought so). But if it doesn't work for you, then it's not for you. Premises may always be rejected; no argument can persuade everyone.
Again, you're under the misapprehension that *what you've read here* is the full extent of my thoughts on the topic. It isn't. Your objections aren't new to me, and I'm under no obligation to go through the motions of a tedious discussion with you just because you (seemingly) want it. Your assumption that this makes me a "fanatic", or indeed that there's *anything* "dishonest" about this, is ludicrous.
I'm going to give you a temporary ban so you can cool off and reflect. Please don't comment on my blog again until you understand (i) that you're not *entitled* to my time, and (ii) that you can't see inside my head, and so you actually have no idea what I've already considered at length. If you repeat these mistakes again in future, the ban will be made permanent.