Doesn’t existence incomparativism rely on ethics being affecting when we should just be comparing worlds instead. Like what’s the argument against making right/wrong distinctions on the basis of basis of the world the comes from the action instead of how it affects someone?
Doesn’t existence incomparativism rely on ethics being affecting when we should just be comparing worlds instead. Like what’s the argument against making right/wrong distinctions on the basis of basis of the world the comes from the action instead of how it affects someone?
I'm sympathetic to the idea that ethics *should* be person-affecting in a broad sense. At the very least, I hope to show that even those who start from a perspective (broadly) along those lines can (and should!) still adopt a future-inclusive conception of beneficence.
Doesn’t existence incomparativism rely on ethics being affecting when we should just be comparing worlds instead. Like what’s the argument against making right/wrong distinctions on the basis of basis of the world the comes from the action instead of how it affects someone?
I'm sympathetic to the idea that ethics *should* be person-affecting in a broad sense. At the very least, I hope to show that even those who start from a perspective (broadly) along those lines can (and should!) still adopt a future-inclusive conception of beneficence.
See also my (related) response to J. Goard: https://rychappell.substack.com/p/the-profoundest-error-in-population/comment/50925681