There is logical space for a view that existence would not be worse for Misery but we should not create Misery. This is Ralf Bader’s view (who tries to defend the asymmetry) but also John Broome’s view (who does not). So it’s a bit misleading to end the Misery example by asking “Should you press the button?” when what you seem mostly interested in are existential harms/benefits.
There is logical space for a view that existence would not be worse for Misery but we should not create Misery. This is Ralf Bader’s view (who tries to defend the asymmetry) but also John Broome’s view (who does not). So it’s a bit misleading to end the Misery example by asking “Should you press the button?” when what you seem mostly interested in are existential harms/benefits.
To clarify: I'm not so much interested in the comparative "worse for" claim, but just the person-affecting welfarist question of whether it is *bad for* Misery (non-comparatively, as per McMahan).
I do think that would be crazy to deny. Though, for sure, there's logical space to hold that you should not press the button but that this is for reasons unrelated to beneficence/non-maleficence. There's logical space to make any number of clearly false claims (and some philosophers do make them!).
There is logical space for a view that existence would not be worse for Misery but we should not create Misery. This is Ralf Bader’s view (who tries to defend the asymmetry) but also John Broome’s view (who does not). So it’s a bit misleading to end the Misery example by asking “Should you press the button?” when what you seem mostly interested in are existential harms/benefits.
To clarify: I'm not so much interested in the comparative "worse for" claim, but just the person-affecting welfarist question of whether it is *bad for* Misery (non-comparatively, as per McMahan).
I do think that would be crazy to deny. Though, for sure, there's logical space to hold that you should not press the button but that this is for reasons unrelated to beneficence/non-maleficence. There's logical space to make any number of clearly false claims (and some philosophers do make them!).