I took the view to be more about what (objectively) *has* merit rather than what *will be assessed* by future experts as having had merit. But either way, it's certainly true that pursuing goals successfully requires some degree of ability to assess what will or will not be an effective means to achieving the goal in question.
I took the view to be more about what (objectively) *has* merit rather than what *will be assessed* by future experts as having had merit. But either way, it's certainly true that pursuing goals successfully requires some degree of ability to assess what will or will not be an effective means to achieving the goal in question.
Talk of a life's "worth" can be ambiguous, though, between more or less objective forms of assessment. Suppose a scientist dedicates their life to curing cancer, and explores some very reasonable avenues in hopes of a breakthrough, but -- through sheer bad luck -- the avenues they explore all turn out to be dead ends. They failed at their central goal. But they did a good job of pursuing it, in the sense that their decisions had high *expected* value. I could see a Nietzschean appealing to a similar idea to validate supporting *reasonable prospects* for advancing excellence, even if it doesn't work out in the end.
I took the view to be more about what (objectively) *has* merit rather than what *will be assessed* by future experts as having had merit. But either way, it's certainly true that pursuing goals successfully requires some degree of ability to assess what will or will not be an effective means to achieving the goal in question.
Talk of a life's "worth" can be ambiguous, though, between more or less objective forms of assessment. Suppose a scientist dedicates their life to curing cancer, and explores some very reasonable avenues in hopes of a breakthrough, but -- through sheer bad luck -- the avenues they explore all turn out to be dead ends. They failed at their central goal. But they did a good job of pursuing it, in the sense that their decisions had high *expected* value. I could see a Nietzschean appealing to a similar idea to validate supporting *reasonable prospects* for advancing excellence, even if it doesn't work out in the end.