Well, it seems you'd at least be committed to hoping that *others* successfully pursue that project, even if you're lamentably constrained from doing so yourself. And you might help indirectly, by trying to convince your fellow deontologists not to be too persuasive in their arguments. It's a kind of forbidden knowledge, after all: moral…
Well, it seems you'd at least be committed to hoping that *others* successfully pursue that project, even if you're lamentably constrained from doing so yourself. And you might help indirectly, by trying to convince your fellow deontologists not to be too persuasive in their arguments. It's a kind of forbidden knowledge, after all: morally bad for people to have, even if (you think it is) true. (There's presumably not any positive obligation to try to convince people of bad truths.)
> "agent-relative deontology is certainly far more popular in the moral literature than agent-neutral one"
I don't know that that's true. People misleadingly started using the phrase "agent-centered constraints" to talk about deontic constraints, and so many deontologists assume that their view is agent-relative, since they certainly accept these constraints. But so do agent-neutral deontologists, so that isn't really any reason to attribute the agent-relative view of constraints to them. I don't think most philosophers have considered the distinction I'm talking about here at all. Like I said, I would expect most to endorse the "against others' violations" (i.e. agent-neutral) view once the distinction is raised to their attention. (E.g., most seem horrified at the thought of agents pushing people off footbridges as a means to saving others.) But I could be wrong. It'd be sociologically interesting to find out.
FWIW I think that the majority of laypeople becoming convinced of act utilitarianism and/or utilitarianism becoming less socially stigmatised in popular culture, newspapers and other media would likely have pretty bad consequences for society, given what the average person is like. But I'm not gonna debate this further point with you, given that this has been going on for a long time and I have other stuff to do, as I'm sure do you
It probably depends how it's done ("become convinced of utilitarianism" is a massively under-described process). But it'd seem interesting enough even if you were merely committed to wishing the most conscientious, epistemically responsible, and morally-motivated individuals to become (competent, instrumentally rational) utilitarians.
Well, it seems you'd at least be committed to hoping that *others* successfully pursue that project, even if you're lamentably constrained from doing so yourself. And you might help indirectly, by trying to convince your fellow deontologists not to be too persuasive in their arguments. It's a kind of forbidden knowledge, after all: morally bad for people to have, even if (you think it is) true. (There's presumably not any positive obligation to try to convince people of bad truths.)
> "agent-relative deontology is certainly far more popular in the moral literature than agent-neutral one"
I don't know that that's true. People misleadingly started using the phrase "agent-centered constraints" to talk about deontic constraints, and so many deontologists assume that their view is agent-relative, since they certainly accept these constraints. But so do agent-neutral deontologists, so that isn't really any reason to attribute the agent-relative view of constraints to them. I don't think most philosophers have considered the distinction I'm talking about here at all. Like I said, I would expect most to endorse the "against others' violations" (i.e. agent-neutral) view once the distinction is raised to their attention. (E.g., most seem horrified at the thought of agents pushing people off footbridges as a means to saving others.) But I could be wrong. It'd be sociologically interesting to find out.
FWIW I think that the majority of laypeople becoming convinced of act utilitarianism and/or utilitarianism becoming less socially stigmatised in popular culture, newspapers and other media would likely have pretty bad consequences for society, given what the average person is like. But I'm not gonna debate this further point with you, given that this has been going on for a long time and I have other stuff to do, as I'm sure do you
It probably depends how it's done ("become convinced of utilitarianism" is a massively under-described process). But it'd seem interesting enough even if you were merely committed to wishing the most conscientious, epistemically responsible, and morally-motivated individuals to become (competent, instrumentally rational) utilitarians.