I think an important element is whether the probability of a future full of suffering actually is tiny. That changes calculations a lot.
If you say "do you want to be born, but with a 1 in a million chance of suffering", it sounds silly to refuse. But is 1 in a million the correct number.
If I say "Do you want to be reincarnated in a rando…
I think an important element is whether the probability of a future full of suffering actually is tiny. That changes calculations a lot.
If you say "do you want to be born, but with a 1 in a million chance of suffering", it sounds silly to refuse. But is 1 in a million the correct number.
If I say "Do you want to be reincarnated in a random animal, given that you have 90% chance to be born as a small fish or bug that will die of hunger a few days after being born, a 9% chance of being a factory farmed animal living in a cramped cage their whole life, and a 1% chance of being a successful human or animal that will reach adulthood", conclusions should be pretty different.
Yes, that's a different issue. I'm using Pettigrew's numbers, which are what is relevant to his argument and the particular kind of risk-aversion that he invokes.
I think an important element is whether the probability of a future full of suffering actually is tiny. That changes calculations a lot.
If you say "do you want to be born, but with a 1 in a million chance of suffering", it sounds silly to refuse. But is 1 in a million the correct number.
If I say "Do you want to be reincarnated in a random animal, given that you have 90% chance to be born as a small fish or bug that will die of hunger a few days after being born, a 9% chance of being a factory farmed animal living in a cramped cage their whole life, and a 1% chance of being a successful human or animal that will reach adulthood", conclusions should be pretty different.
Yes, that's a different issue. I'm using Pettigrew's numbers, which are what is relevant to his argument and the particular kind of risk-aversion that he invokes.