"My second question, on beneficence and self-sacrifice, looks at how acting to promote the good can diverge from ordinary conceptions of “altruistic” behavior (which place more weight on self-sacrifice than on actually helping others). In my essay, I argue that the ordinary conception illicitly conflates being good with looking good. So I think the EA conception is a clear improvement."
Perhaps your book gets into more detail on this, and already answers the issue I see with your argument here. In case it doesn't, though, I feel I should raise it now.
It is certainly possible to be altruistic without being significantly self-sacrificing. An obvious example is a wealthy altruist giving millions of dollars to charities, such charitable donations can make a big difference even as the wealthy altruist doesn't experience any negative impact from losing this small portion of their wealth.
Still, your phrasing of *promote the good* makes me think of words rather than actions. I think promoting good with words without an equally strong measure of good actions can cause a lot of cynicism and sometimes even backlash. I think of how many people react to very wealthy celebrities asking people to give money to a certain cause - many react by essentially saying "You're far more wealthy than I am, why aren't *YOU* giving?"
I also think of how a lot of conservatives react to the climate change movement. Now, I believe the scientific evidence for climate change is strong. I think there are legitimate concern here. That being said, I very much *get* the conservative criticism of some prominent climate change activists who get on private jets, travelling around the world a lot, to go to various conferences, *greatly enlarging their carbon footprint through this travel.* In contrast, think of Greta Thunberg. From what I've read, Thunberg made real personal sacrifices to try to lower her own carbon footprint, and I think that this really helped her environmental activism and contributed to her becoming something of a star.
In any event, I think moral promotion without similarly strong moral action can be self-defeating. A lot of people do care if someone "practices what they preach", so to speak. Hypocrisy is one of the most common criticisms in the world of politics precisely because it's often an effective criticism. Someone who is perceived to be a hypocrite will tend to lose at least some support because of it.
If you're promoting a particular moral code or moral practice, I think it's very helpful if you can point to some form of evidence that you yourself are following that code/practice, whatever it may be. (I'm using 'you' in a general sense here, not you personally). If that code/practice calls for some level of self-sacrifice, then self-sacrifice *is* important, in and of itself.
To clarify, I don't intend "promote" here to imply mere words rather than actions. (Philosophical usage here means something closer to "bring about more of". Apologies for any confusion!)
Can't wait for the book and the series! By the way, would your book/series be approaching it from a Beneficentrist angle or a more full-blooded Utilitarian angle?
Also: how do you distinguish between the weak/minimal Beneficentrist claim from the Rossian prima facie duty (or pro tanto reason) of Beneficence? Seems to me they are practically equivalent.
Also: taking the minimal Beneficentrist/Rossian claim, plus the empirical claim that there are large/enormous numbers of global poor/future generations, plus an aggregative view of how reasons (and their weights) add up together, it seems to me that one arrives at a stronger Beneficentrism strong enough to support Effective Altruism and Longtermism, yeah? Or am I utterly misguided by the whole thing?
I mostly wrote this one from an ecumenical beneficentric perspective, though there are a couple of spots - especially in my responses to the responses - where some full-blooded utilitarian arguments shine through :-)
I basically take the message of beneficentrism to be: "give due weight to Rossian-style reasons of beneficence - they matter a lot!" So yeah, I wouldn't necessarily suggest that one needs to *distinguish* these. It's fine for them to coincide!
I agree with your last paragraph (and offer a similar style of argument for longtermism in my starter essay on that topic).
"My second question, on beneficence and self-sacrifice, looks at how acting to promote the good can diverge from ordinary conceptions of “altruistic” behavior (which place more weight on self-sacrifice than on actually helping others). In my essay, I argue that the ordinary conception illicitly conflates being good with looking good. So I think the EA conception is a clear improvement."
Perhaps your book gets into more detail on this, and already answers the issue I see with your argument here. In case it doesn't, though, I feel I should raise it now.
It is certainly possible to be altruistic without being significantly self-sacrificing. An obvious example is a wealthy altruist giving millions of dollars to charities, such charitable donations can make a big difference even as the wealthy altruist doesn't experience any negative impact from losing this small portion of their wealth.
Still, your phrasing of *promote the good* makes me think of words rather than actions. I think promoting good with words without an equally strong measure of good actions can cause a lot of cynicism and sometimes even backlash. I think of how many people react to very wealthy celebrities asking people to give money to a certain cause - many react by essentially saying "You're far more wealthy than I am, why aren't *YOU* giving?"
I also think of how a lot of conservatives react to the climate change movement. Now, I believe the scientific evidence for climate change is strong. I think there are legitimate concern here. That being said, I very much *get* the conservative criticism of some prominent climate change activists who get on private jets, travelling around the world a lot, to go to various conferences, *greatly enlarging their carbon footprint through this travel.* In contrast, think of Greta Thunberg. From what I've read, Thunberg made real personal sacrifices to try to lower her own carbon footprint, and I think that this really helped her environmental activism and contributed to her becoming something of a star.
In any event, I think moral promotion without similarly strong moral action can be self-defeating. A lot of people do care if someone "practices what they preach", so to speak. Hypocrisy is one of the most common criticisms in the world of politics precisely because it's often an effective criticism. Someone who is perceived to be a hypocrite will tend to lose at least some support because of it.
If you're promoting a particular moral code or moral practice, I think it's very helpful if you can point to some form of evidence that you yourself are following that code/practice, whatever it may be. (I'm using 'you' in a general sense here, not you personally). If that code/practice calls for some level of self-sacrifice, then self-sacrifice *is* important, in and of itself.
To clarify, I don't intend "promote" here to imply mere words rather than actions. (Philosophical usage here means something closer to "bring about more of". Apologies for any confusion!)
Ok, your argument makes a lot more sense to me then. Thanks.
Can't wait for the book and the series! By the way, would your book/series be approaching it from a Beneficentrist angle or a more full-blooded Utilitarian angle?
Also: how do you distinguish between the weak/minimal Beneficentrist claim from the Rossian prima facie duty (or pro tanto reason) of Beneficence? Seems to me they are practically equivalent.
Also: taking the minimal Beneficentrist/Rossian claim, plus the empirical claim that there are large/enormous numbers of global poor/future generations, plus an aggregative view of how reasons (and their weights) add up together, it seems to me that one arrives at a stronger Beneficentrism strong enough to support Effective Altruism and Longtermism, yeah? Or am I utterly misguided by the whole thing?
I mostly wrote this one from an ecumenical beneficentric perspective, though there are a couple of spots - especially in my responses to the responses - where some full-blooded utilitarian arguments shine through :-)
I basically take the message of beneficentrism to be: "give due weight to Rossian-style reasons of beneficence - they matter a lot!" So yeah, I wouldn't necessarily suggest that one needs to *distinguish* these. It's fine for them to coincide!
I agree with your last paragraph (and offer a similar style of argument for longtermism in my starter essay on that topic).