I feel like this passage is a bit unclear about whether it is about beneficence generally (which I take to be any and all forms of bringing about good ends, perhaps with the assumption that what makes an end good is that it is good for various individuals) or about saving lives in particular (as opposed to benefiting individuals by reducing the amount they are affected by transphobia or pollution or whatever).
To me, it seems that there's a stronger argument against engaging in the culture war on the grounds that the culture war is less effective than some apparently more roundabout means at reducing the effects of transphobia and pollution on individuals, than there is that engaging in the culture war comes at the opportunity cost of saving lives.
Writing checks to the Against Malaria Foundation doesn't take much time or attention, and thus leaves you with a question of whether there are effective and beneficent things to do with that time and attention. It makes sense to me that one would want to use that time and attention on the things it is most effective at, which will often be local causes, often including fighting those -isms that you mention. But my claim would be that denouncing those -ists and heating up the culture war is just a much less effective way to do that than many other options, even though it may feel more emotionally satisfying.
I don't mean to restrict beneficence to only saving lives. But I would like to prompt people to (i) consider how they might do more good, and (ii) cast a wide net in doing so. I expect that time and attention to local causes could often be used to greater effect in other ways (e.g., encouraging others in one's local network to donate to AMF and generally focus more on global problems; working overtime and donating the extra money, etc.).
Given the ways that time can be turned into money and vice versa, I'm generally suspicious of the idea that it makes sense to spend a lot of time on local causes if it doesn't make sense to spend a lot of money on them. I'd expect the optimal cause to exert a greater gravitational pull on beneficent efforts than you seem to be imagining. But it's ultimately an empirical question -- my background assumptions/expectations here could be mistaken.
Made me realise (somewhat surprisingly) that I never REALLY considered political causes to be directly moral causes. I think of them as being subject to moral judgement, of course (some appear evil, other morally good) but I don't think of the MOTIVATION to pursue them as chiefly moral, it feels like it lies somewhere between self-interest and a broader social project. Not dissimilar to building something, or an industrial enterprise, for example. I wonder if it's because my personal mortality is almost entirely about beneficence (tho not universal/utilitarian in flavour) AND because I very rarely pursue goals for purely moral reasons (so for example much of my day to day helpfulness or community engagement is only tangentially a moral enterprise).
I feel like this passage is a bit unclear about whether it is about beneficence generally (which I take to be any and all forms of bringing about good ends, perhaps with the assumption that what makes an end good is that it is good for various individuals) or about saving lives in particular (as opposed to benefiting individuals by reducing the amount they are affected by transphobia or pollution or whatever).
To me, it seems that there's a stronger argument against engaging in the culture war on the grounds that the culture war is less effective than some apparently more roundabout means at reducing the effects of transphobia and pollution on individuals, than there is that engaging in the culture war comes at the opportunity cost of saving lives.
Writing checks to the Against Malaria Foundation doesn't take much time or attention, and thus leaves you with a question of whether there are effective and beneficent things to do with that time and attention. It makes sense to me that one would want to use that time and attention on the things it is most effective at, which will often be local causes, often including fighting those -isms that you mention. But my claim would be that denouncing those -ists and heating up the culture war is just a much less effective way to do that than many other options, even though it may feel more emotionally satisfying.
I don't mean to restrict beneficence to only saving lives. But I would like to prompt people to (i) consider how they might do more good, and (ii) cast a wide net in doing so. I expect that time and attention to local causes could often be used to greater effect in other ways (e.g., encouraging others in one's local network to donate to AMF and generally focus more on global problems; working overtime and donating the extra money, etc.).
Given the ways that time can be turned into money and vice versa, I'm generally suspicious of the idea that it makes sense to spend a lot of time on local causes if it doesn't make sense to spend a lot of money on them. I'd expect the optimal cause to exert a greater gravitational pull on beneficent efforts than you seem to be imagining. But it's ultimately an empirical question -- my background assumptions/expectations here could be mistaken.
Made me realise (somewhat surprisingly) that I never REALLY considered political causes to be directly moral causes. I think of them as being subject to moral judgement, of course (some appear evil, other morally good) but I don't think of the MOTIVATION to pursue them as chiefly moral, it feels like it lies somewhere between self-interest and a broader social project. Not dissimilar to building something, or an industrial enterprise, for example. I wonder if it's because my personal mortality is almost entirely about beneficence (tho not universal/utilitarian in flavour) AND because I very rarely pursue goals for purely moral reasons (so for example much of my day to day helpfulness or community engagement is only tangentially a moral enterprise).
All in all, really interesting, thank you.