Here’s a plausible principle: the prior probability of some set of initial conditions doesn’t depend on the higher order properties of it. For instance, things following the shroedinger equation aren’t more likely simply because they’ll result in complex things. But if this is true, then your solution runs into troubles -- the likelihood of psychophysical laws can’t have anything to do with whether they cause humans with accurate beliefs.
I'm not sure exactly what you have in mind by "higher order properties", but I'm not committed to the probabilities of possible laws having "anything to do with whether they cause humans with accurate beliefs". I think disharmonious worlds have lower likelihood. I didn't give an account of precisely why this is. (But, fwiw, I would sooner point to the disharmony itself than to any downstream effects regarding "accurate beliefs".)
The original comment was typed out hastily and imprecisely worded. What I mean by a higher-order property is a property that emerges from the fundamental level, rather than the fundamental laws themselves. Of course, if you say that laws that result in radical disharmony are intrinsically less probable, not because they make agents have disharmony but instead because of the laws themselves, that seems plausible enough, and is my preferred response to psychophysical harmony. Though I don't think that that provides an account of why other skeptical scenarios are improbable--suppose that there are some simple mathematical equations that generate mostly Boltzmann brains. It seems utterly bizarre to think that the fact that this makes most agents deceived could affect the intrinsic likelihood of the laws.
I'm open to the possibility that some systematizing explanation could also work. I just haven't yet seen one that I'm convinced by!
The problem with monism (at least, physicalism) is that it gets the space of possibilities wrong.
Idealism is actually much the same as dualism on the mind-body front (there could be disharmony between the phenomenal properties representing our brains/bodies and the phenomenal properties of pleasure/pain that we personally experience). But you'll have to wait for the release of Helen's book (chapter 3) for the full story there:
An interesting response from Brian Cutter on the public FB thread: https://www.facebook.com/richard.chappell/posts/pfbid0r8rNLkNHF6dq61VHyZsaURXSULRNMJNtDPKBiJggEXT2Da9NDyUPccUUdQhQGnpkl?comment_id=278901985045766
Here’s a plausible principle: the prior probability of some set of initial conditions doesn’t depend on the higher order properties of it. For instance, things following the shroedinger equation aren’t more likely simply because they’ll result in complex things. But if this is true, then your solution runs into troubles -- the likelihood of psychophysical laws can’t have anything to do with whether they cause humans with accurate beliefs.
I'm not sure exactly what you have in mind by "higher order properties", but I'm not committed to the probabilities of possible laws having "anything to do with whether they cause humans with accurate beliefs". I think disharmonious worlds have lower likelihood. I didn't give an account of precisely why this is. (But, fwiw, I would sooner point to the disharmony itself than to any downstream effects regarding "accurate beliefs".)
The original comment was typed out hastily and imprecisely worded. What I mean by a higher-order property is a property that emerges from the fundamental level, rather than the fundamental laws themselves. Of course, if you say that laws that result in radical disharmony are intrinsically less probable, not because they make agents have disharmony but instead because of the laws themselves, that seems plausible enough, and is my preferred response to psychophysical harmony. Though I don't think that that provides an account of why other skeptical scenarios are improbable--suppose that there are some simple mathematical equations that generate mostly Boltzmann brains. It seems utterly bizarre to think that the fact that this makes most agents deceived could affect the intrinsic likelihood of the laws.
I'm open to the possibility that some systematizing explanation could also work. I just haven't yet seen one that I'm convinced by!
The problem with monism (at least, physicalism) is that it gets the space of possibilities wrong.
Idealism is actually much the same as dualism on the mind-body front (there could be disharmony between the phenomenal properties representing our brains/bodies and the phenomenal properties of pleasure/pain that we personally experience). But you'll have to wait for the release of Helen's book (chapter 3) for the full story there:
http://yetterchappell.net/Helen/idealism-book.html