> "besides possibly reasons regarding welfare, are there any other reasons or duties (to people, say) that shouldn’t be valued negatively or conditionally?"
This is just the question of whether anything else is good. I'm pretty sympathetic to welfarism, but plausible non-welfarist goods could include things like natural beauty, impressive…
> "besides possibly reasons regarding welfare, are there any other reasons or duties (to people, say) that shouldn’t be valued negatively or conditionally?"
This is just the question of whether anything else is good. I'm pretty sympathetic to welfarism, but plausible non-welfarist goods could include things like natural beauty, impressive cultural attainments / perfectionist goods, etc.
> "The point is that you can turn someone into any other kind of person of your choice, with any other kinds of preferences, as long as overall preference satisfaction increases."
It wouldn't be a benefit *to that person* if you changed them so radically as to undermine their personal identity. If you're talking about killing & replacement (which seems very different from *paternalistic* interventions on an individual), one may reject that on grounds of either partiality or deontic rights violation. It's a very familiar idea in ethics that some impartially better worlds aren't ones we should want to see realized: there are other things we should care about in addition to impartial value. The suggestion that there's *nothing* (even pro tanto) better about the happier replacement is a silly overreaction -- like denying that it's in any way better to kill one to save five.
> "besides possibly reasons regarding welfare, are there any other reasons or duties (to people, say) that shouldn’t be valued negatively or conditionally?"
This is just the question of whether anything else is good. I'm pretty sympathetic to welfarism, but plausible non-welfarist goods could include things like natural beauty, impressive cultural attainments / perfectionist goods, etc.
> "The point is that you can turn someone into any other kind of person of your choice, with any other kinds of preferences, as long as overall preference satisfaction increases."
It wouldn't be a benefit *to that person* if you changed them so radically as to undermine their personal identity. If you're talking about killing & replacement (which seems very different from *paternalistic* interventions on an individual), one may reject that on grounds of either partiality or deontic rights violation. It's a very familiar idea in ethics that some impartially better worlds aren't ones we should want to see realized: there are other things we should care about in addition to impartial value. The suggestion that there's *nothing* (even pro tanto) better about the happier replacement is a silly overreaction -- like denying that it's in any way better to kill one to save five.