Interesting! I think one can combine Parfitian reductionism about personal identity with the thought that individuals (rather than just the experiences they contain) are what *fundamentally* matter. Otherwise it's very hard to make sense of any kind of loving/cherishing attitudes, and the latter do not seem strictly irrational/unwarrante…
Interesting! I think one can combine Parfitian reductionism about personal identity with the thought that individuals (rather than just the experiences they contain) are what *fundamentally* matter. Otherwise it's very hard to make sense of any kind of loving/cherishing attitudes, and the latter do not seem strictly irrational/unwarranted. G.A. Cohen's "Rescuing Conservatism: a defense of existing value" nicely brings out the importance of non-fungible valuation, I think: https://philpapers.org/rec/COHCR
That's a really interesting citation on such a topic! I'll see if I can get a hold of it.
The biggest problem for me is similar to the "paralysis argument" against some deontological constraints: every prima facie morally neutral thing we do swaps future persons for other future persons. This seems fine for someone who defends the present-future asymmetry of moral status in other contexts, such as the 200-year landmine in a schoolyard, but for those who don't, thinking there might be something (predictably) bad about altering the precise moment two strangers complete sexual intercourse, seems far more counterintuitive than fungibility. (As does the other escape from the problem, pre-existing souls.)
It may be that future people can, in effect, be treated as fungible, since their identities aren't really set yet. Also, the pro tanto "regrettability" of bring into existence X rather than Y is precisely balanced by that of bringing Y rather than X. So there's no reason to prefer paralysis.
Interesting! I think one can combine Parfitian reductionism about personal identity with the thought that individuals (rather than just the experiences they contain) are what *fundamentally* matter. Otherwise it's very hard to make sense of any kind of loving/cherishing attitudes, and the latter do not seem strictly irrational/unwarranted. G.A. Cohen's "Rescuing Conservatism: a defense of existing value" nicely brings out the importance of non-fungible valuation, I think: https://philpapers.org/rec/COHCR
That's a really interesting citation on such a topic! I'll see if I can get a hold of it.
The biggest problem for me is similar to the "paralysis argument" against some deontological constraints: every prima facie morally neutral thing we do swaps future persons for other future persons. This seems fine for someone who defends the present-future asymmetry of moral status in other contexts, such as the 200-year landmine in a schoolyard, but for those who don't, thinking there might be something (predictably) bad about altering the precise moment two strangers complete sexual intercourse, seems far more counterintuitive than fungibility. (As does the other escape from the problem, pre-existing souls.)
It may be that future people can, in effect, be treated as fungible, since their identities aren't really set yet. Also, the pro tanto "regrettability" of bring into existence X rather than Y is precisely balanced by that of bringing Y rather than X. So there's no reason to prefer paralysis.