I think there's often a correlation between simplicity and inherent plausibility. But it's the latter that matters. If an additional principle is both (i) intrinsically plausible, and (ii) yields more plausible verdicts, without conflicting with any (all-things-considered) more-plausible principles, the mere fact that it is an *additiona…
I think there's often a correlation between simplicity and inherent plausibility. But it's the latter that matters. If an additional principle is both (i) intrinsically plausible, and (ii) yields more plausible verdicts, without conflicting with any (all-things-considered) more-plausible principles, the mere fact that it is an *additional* principle is no reason at all to reject it.
In other words, while we often have reason to reject more complex theories, it is because they are implausibly gerrymandered (i.e. intrinsically implausible), not just because they are complex.
If a new principle yields more plausible verdicts, then I think there's a cost it's just outweighed. What is the virtue of not being gerrymandered? If it means not positing new principles that are different from the others, that doesn't explain what's wrong with positing epiphenomenal particles, and if it means not positing new principles then it's just simplicity repackaged.
It probably doesn't make a great deal of difference whether one gives "literally zero" or just "very little" weight to simplicity relative to intrinsic plausibility. The main point I wanted to convey was that it's a mistake for people to assume that utilitarians must be *prioritizing* simplicity over substantive plausibility, as I certainly don't feel the slightest inclination to do *that*.
I agree that one shouldn't posit extra things for absolutely no reason. I'd be more inclined to say that this is because the extra posit lacks plausibility. If that counts as "simplicity repackaged" then perhaps I'm on board with some simplicity considerations after all. But I'm disposed to give lexical priority to considerations of plausibility when the two come into conflict. I don't particularly feel any impulse to prefer a shorter list of objective goods, for example; I'd simply want to characterize all and only the things that strike me, upon reflection, as seeming objectively good (without any particular concern for what the number of such goods turns out to be).
Obviously you don't intend that to be more than a very brief sketch your view about this, but I just want emphasize that I think it needs much fleshing out. As I alluded to in my other comment, I think these sort of questions are very difficult and quickly spiral off into the deepest areas of philosophy.
I think there's often a correlation between simplicity and inherent plausibility. But it's the latter that matters. If an additional principle is both (i) intrinsically plausible, and (ii) yields more plausible verdicts, without conflicting with any (all-things-considered) more-plausible principles, the mere fact that it is an *additional* principle is no reason at all to reject it.
In other words, while we often have reason to reject more complex theories, it is because they are implausibly gerrymandered (i.e. intrinsically implausible), not just because they are complex.
If a new principle yields more plausible verdicts, then I think there's a cost it's just outweighed. What is the virtue of not being gerrymandered? If it means not positing new principles that are different from the others, that doesn't explain what's wrong with positing epiphenomenal particles, and if it means not positing new principles then it's just simplicity repackaged.
It probably doesn't make a great deal of difference whether one gives "literally zero" or just "very little" weight to simplicity relative to intrinsic plausibility. The main point I wanted to convey was that it's a mistake for people to assume that utilitarians must be *prioritizing* simplicity over substantive plausibility, as I certainly don't feel the slightest inclination to do *that*.
I agree that one shouldn't posit extra things for absolutely no reason. I'd be more inclined to say that this is because the extra posit lacks plausibility. If that counts as "simplicity repackaged" then perhaps I'm on board with some simplicity considerations after all. But I'm disposed to give lexical priority to considerations of plausibility when the two come into conflict. I don't particularly feel any impulse to prefer a shorter list of objective goods, for example; I'd simply want to characterize all and only the things that strike me, upon reflection, as seeming objectively good (without any particular concern for what the number of such goods turns out to be).
Obviously you don't intend that to be more than a very brief sketch your view about this, but I just want emphasize that I think it needs much fleshing out. As I alluded to in my other comment, I think these sort of questions are very difficult and quickly spiral off into the deepest areas of philosophy.