In this one, my main disagreement is that I like a sort of "global consequentialism", where I agree that we shouldn't evaluate actions on the basis of a broader rule that leads to them, but I also think we shouldn't evaluate rules on the basis of the actions they lead to - each should be evaluated in its own right. I see virtues and character traits as other points of evaluation that deserve their own consequentialist analysis.
I've come to this from thinking about the Newcomb problem, and thinking parallel thoughts about rationality. The rational action in the Newcomb problem is two-boxing, but a rational person is a one-boxer.
The issue is that we don't usually control acts purely by force of will in the moment - most of our acts are partly habitual and partly controlled by plans made in advance, as well as partly by the will in the moment. Thus, moral and rational evaluation should come at each of these levels, even though there are sometimes conflicts between them.
I'm sympathetic to a lot of that. My latest post sets out where I agree with global consequentialism (yes, we should evaluate each focal point in its own right) and where I disagree (we can also assess the fittingness of attitudes, which can diverge significantly from their value): https://rychappell.substack.com/p/consequentialism-beyond-action
This series is really helpful, both to help me understand Parfit and also your views, and to see where I do and don’t agree with each of you!
Thanks! Feel free to expand upon any points of disagreement :-)
In this one, my main disagreement is that I like a sort of "global consequentialism", where I agree that we shouldn't evaluate actions on the basis of a broader rule that leads to them, but I also think we shouldn't evaluate rules on the basis of the actions they lead to - each should be evaluated in its own right. I see virtues and character traits as other points of evaluation that deserve their own consequentialist analysis.
I've come to this from thinking about the Newcomb problem, and thinking parallel thoughts about rationality. The rational action in the Newcomb problem is two-boxing, but a rational person is a one-boxer.
The issue is that we don't usually control acts purely by force of will in the moment - most of our acts are partly habitual and partly controlled by plans made in advance, as well as partly by the will in the moment. Thus, moral and rational evaluation should come at each of these levels, even though there are sometimes conflicts between them.
I'm sympathetic to a lot of that. My latest post sets out where I agree with global consequentialism (yes, we should evaluate each focal point in its own right) and where I disagree (we can also assess the fittingness of attitudes, which can diverge significantly from their value): https://rychappell.substack.com/p/consequentialism-beyond-action