I don't know what you mean by "metaphysical" rights. But there are real normative questions of (i) what legal rights should be instituted (by law), and (ii) what moral rights should be instituted (by social norms). I think in both cases, the answer is determined on utilitarian grounds: we should institute just those rights that it would …
I don't know what you mean by "metaphysical" rights. But there are real normative questions of (i) what legal rights should be instituted (by law), and (ii) what moral rights should be instituted (by social norms). I think in both cases, the answer is determined on utilitarian grounds: we should institute just those rights that it would be best to so institute.
So, for example, I think it would be best if the government were legally obliged to follow due process and just compensation, rather than performing a utilitarian calculation in each instance to determine whether or not to do this. So, in that sense, I recognize rights.
Thanks for the additional response. I mean natural rights (although I would argue that they are non-natural). The legal positivist view you raise is just another step in the circularity of utilitarian rights (social benefit --> government action --> rights --> social benefit). Your view is most likely the prevailing view among legal philosophers, which is why I'll be taking the time to critique it in future posts when making the case for natural law.
If your view is just enlightened utilitarianism, then there is nothing in principle that would require a government to provide due process/fair compensation after a taking if the utilitarian calculus goes a certain way. And if there is something in principle that requires due process/fair compensation in all cases, isn't this rule utilitarianism? And what's the basis for that rule besides welfare?
Gibbard defends rights on practicality and non-utilitarian principles, which raises the question of what justifies these non-utilitarian principles?
Thanks again for taking the time. Don't feel the need to respond further if you'd rather not, although I hope to read how you would address these concerns in the future.
I don't know what you mean by "metaphysical" rights. But there are real normative questions of (i) what legal rights should be instituted (by law), and (ii) what moral rights should be instituted (by social norms). I think in both cases, the answer is determined on utilitarian grounds: we should institute just those rights that it would be best to so institute.
So, for example, I think it would be best if the government were legally obliged to follow due process and just compensation, rather than performing a utilitarian calculation in each instance to determine whether or not to do this. So, in that sense, I recognize rights.
See also Gibbard (1984), 'Utilitarianism and Human Rights': https://philpapers.org/rec/GIBUAH
Thanks for the additional response. I mean natural rights (although I would argue that they are non-natural). The legal positivist view you raise is just another step in the circularity of utilitarian rights (social benefit --> government action --> rights --> social benefit). Your view is most likely the prevailing view among legal philosophers, which is why I'll be taking the time to critique it in future posts when making the case for natural law.
If your view is just enlightened utilitarianism, then there is nothing in principle that would require a government to provide due process/fair compensation after a taking if the utilitarian calculus goes a certain way. And if there is something in principle that requires due process/fair compensation in all cases, isn't this rule utilitarianism? And what's the basis for that rule besides welfare?
Gibbard defends rights on practicality and non-utilitarian principles, which raises the question of what justifies these non-utilitarian principles?
Thanks again for taking the time. Don't feel the need to respond further if you'd rather not, although I hope to read how you would address these concerns in the future.