> isn't this circular? Rights shouldn't be violated by actions that are socially benefical, yet what is socially beneficial determines our rights.
I'm not sure if I'm parsing your sentence correctly. The way I understand it, the scenario under consideration is that you are a utilitarian who finds themselves in a society. The society has s…
> isn't this circular? Rights shouldn't be violated by actions that are socially benefical, yet what is socially beneficial determines our rights.
I'm not sure if I'm parsing your sentence correctly. The way I understand it, the scenario under consideration is that you are a utilitarian who finds themselves in a society. The society has some rules and some concepts of rights, and you agree with some but not necessarily all of those rules and rights. (E.g. perhaps society thinks women and men deserve equal rights, but homosexuals do not have the same rights as heterosexuals -- and you agree that women and men deserve equal rights, but you think homosexuals also deserve the same rights as heterosexuals).
Given this disagreement, there are several distinct things going on simultaneously here, and also some equivocation of at least two different things we may mean by "rights":
1. You can try to influence society, via debate or legislation, so that its opinions on rights and rules move closer towards what you think they should be.
2. You can make decisions on which of society's rules to follow and when to follow them.
3. You can make decisions on when to violate someone's "rights" for the greater good, where "rights" refers to a right granted by society that you may or may not agree with. "What are his/her/my rights?" in this context is an empirically question that one can resolve by observing the society in question (e.g. reading its code of laws).
4. You can make decisions on when to violate someone's "rights" for the greater good, where "rights" refer to a right you think someone should have, even if society doesn't agree with you. "What are his/her/my rights?" in this context is not directly observable -- and the you may not even have a coherent answer to the question yet. Perhaps you're still exploring the question.
I think Richard's post concerns with points 2 and 3 (and maybe to a lesser degree 4), and is trying to address the misconception that some people have that utilitarians are dangerous, because they might go around breaking rule and violating rights due to their naive application of utilitarianism.
It's unclear to me whether you are talking about 3 or 4 in your comments. A utilitarian might go through a different thought process when performing the evaluation in 3 vs in 4, even though both situations use the word "rights". Is that where the confusion is coming from?
Thanks for the response. What I’m referring to in my comment are metaphysical rights and whether these would be rights at all under a utilitarian framework (in which case I don’t think the word means anything.)
For instance, if the government took someone’s property without compensation, this action might be justified under utilitarianism (say, the benefits of the taken property are widespread and the person is who lost the property is rich enough to not care too much).
Yet if metaphysical rights were taken seriously, the government would be obligated provide due process and just compensation when taking someone else’s property, regardless of the utilitarian calculus. So my question asks to what extent does utilitarianism recognize rights.
It's pretty clear that utilitarians in general don't recognize "metaphysical" rights, isn't it? As Richard says (and I think most utilitarians would agree), "rights are a kind of social institution." Your view that "rights" are objective and "the good" is subjective is almost (though not precisely) diametrically opposed to his view that "what matters" is an objective question and that "rights" are social conventions.
Yes, my question was meant to know what "rights" mean under prudent utilitarianism, since the word has been used. Nothing, it seems like. And failure to respect the "is ought" distinction is certaintly one of my issues with utilitarianism.
I don't know what you mean by "metaphysical" rights. But there are real normative questions of (i) what legal rights should be instituted (by law), and (ii) what moral rights should be instituted (by social norms). I think in both cases, the answer is determined on utilitarian grounds: we should institute just those rights that it would be best to so institute.
So, for example, I think it would be best if the government were legally obliged to follow due process and just compensation, rather than performing a utilitarian calculation in each instance to determine whether or not to do this. So, in that sense, I recognize rights.
Thanks for the additional response. I mean natural rights (although I would argue that they are non-natural). The legal positivist view you raise is just another step in the circularity of utilitarian rights (social benefit --> government action --> rights --> social benefit). Your view is most likely the prevailing view among legal philosophers, which is why I'll be taking the time to critique it in future posts when making the case for natural law.
If your view is just enlightened utilitarianism, then there is nothing in principle that would require a government to provide due process/fair compensation after a taking if the utilitarian calculus goes a certain way. And if there is something in principle that requires due process/fair compensation in all cases, isn't this rule utilitarianism? And what's the basis for that rule besides welfare?
Gibbard defends rights on practicality and non-utilitarian principles, which raises the question of what justifies these non-utilitarian principles?
Thanks again for taking the time. Don't feel the need to respond further if you'd rather not, although I hope to read how you would address these concerns in the future.
> isn't this circular? Rights shouldn't be violated by actions that are socially benefical, yet what is socially beneficial determines our rights.
I'm not sure if I'm parsing your sentence correctly. The way I understand it, the scenario under consideration is that you are a utilitarian who finds themselves in a society. The society has some rules and some concepts of rights, and you agree with some but not necessarily all of those rules and rights. (E.g. perhaps society thinks women and men deserve equal rights, but homosexuals do not have the same rights as heterosexuals -- and you agree that women and men deserve equal rights, but you think homosexuals also deserve the same rights as heterosexuals).
Given this disagreement, there are several distinct things going on simultaneously here, and also some equivocation of at least two different things we may mean by "rights":
1. You can try to influence society, via debate or legislation, so that its opinions on rights and rules move closer towards what you think they should be.
2. You can make decisions on which of society's rules to follow and when to follow them.
3. You can make decisions on when to violate someone's "rights" for the greater good, where "rights" refers to a right granted by society that you may or may not agree with. "What are his/her/my rights?" in this context is an empirically question that one can resolve by observing the society in question (e.g. reading its code of laws).
4. You can make decisions on when to violate someone's "rights" for the greater good, where "rights" refer to a right you think someone should have, even if society doesn't agree with you. "What are his/her/my rights?" in this context is not directly observable -- and the you may not even have a coherent answer to the question yet. Perhaps you're still exploring the question.
I think Richard's post concerns with points 2 and 3 (and maybe to a lesser degree 4), and is trying to address the misconception that some people have that utilitarians are dangerous, because they might go around breaking rule and violating rights due to their naive application of utilitarianism.
It's unclear to me whether you are talking about 3 or 4 in your comments. A utilitarian might go through a different thought process when performing the evaluation in 3 vs in 4, even though both situations use the word "rights". Is that where the confusion is coming from?
Thanks for the response. What I’m referring to in my comment are metaphysical rights and whether these would be rights at all under a utilitarian framework (in which case I don’t think the word means anything.)
For instance, if the government took someone’s property without compensation, this action might be justified under utilitarianism (say, the benefits of the taken property are widespread and the person is who lost the property is rich enough to not care too much).
Yet if metaphysical rights were taken seriously, the government would be obligated provide due process and just compensation when taking someone else’s property, regardless of the utilitarian calculus. So my question asks to what extent does utilitarianism recognize rights.
It's pretty clear that utilitarians in general don't recognize "metaphysical" rights, isn't it? As Richard says (and I think most utilitarians would agree), "rights are a kind of social institution." Your view that "rights" are objective and "the good" is subjective is almost (though not precisely) diametrically opposed to his view that "what matters" is an objective question and that "rights" are social conventions.
I have enjoyed reading your posts, by the way!
Yes, my question was meant to know what "rights" mean under prudent utilitarianism, since the word has been used. Nothing, it seems like. And failure to respect the "is ought" distinction is certaintly one of my issues with utilitarianism.
And thank you!
I don't know what you mean by "metaphysical" rights. But there are real normative questions of (i) what legal rights should be instituted (by law), and (ii) what moral rights should be instituted (by social norms). I think in both cases, the answer is determined on utilitarian grounds: we should institute just those rights that it would be best to so institute.
So, for example, I think it would be best if the government were legally obliged to follow due process and just compensation, rather than performing a utilitarian calculation in each instance to determine whether or not to do this. So, in that sense, I recognize rights.
See also Gibbard (1984), 'Utilitarianism and Human Rights': https://philpapers.org/rec/GIBUAH
Thanks for the additional response. I mean natural rights (although I would argue that they are non-natural). The legal positivist view you raise is just another step in the circularity of utilitarian rights (social benefit --> government action --> rights --> social benefit). Your view is most likely the prevailing view among legal philosophers, which is why I'll be taking the time to critique it in future posts when making the case for natural law.
If your view is just enlightened utilitarianism, then there is nothing in principle that would require a government to provide due process/fair compensation after a taking if the utilitarian calculus goes a certain way. And if there is something in principle that requires due process/fair compensation in all cases, isn't this rule utilitarianism? And what's the basis for that rule besides welfare?
Gibbard defends rights on practicality and non-utilitarian principles, which raises the question of what justifies these non-utilitarian principles?
Thanks again for taking the time. Don't feel the need to respond further if you'd rather not, although I hope to read how you would address these concerns in the future.