Yeah, that's possible. I think it's unusual to be in such an asymmetric (high upside / low downside from cheating) situation, and it's important to pay attention to possible downsides (just look at all the broader reputational harm caused by SBF's fraud). But I'm not claiming that norm-breaking could *never* be rationally justified. Just…
Yeah, that's possible. I think it's unusual to be in such an asymmetric (high upside / low downside from cheating) situation, and it's important to pay attention to possible downsides (just look at all the broader reputational harm caused by SBF's fraud). But I'm not claiming that norm-breaking could *never* be rationally justified. Just that I think we should start from a very strong pro-social/co-operative disposition, and not be *easily* swayed into norm-breaking defection based just on very speculative/unreliable reasons for thinking oneself to be the rare exception to the rule.
I tend to agree. But my point that how often you ought to be swayed may depend on if you adopt radical hedonistic utilitarian values such as extreme concern for animals or the exchangeability of current people with "merely possible" people.
It might -- I don't find it immediately obvious either way. I'd mostly just clarify that it doesn't follow directly from the higher stakes, but more indirectly (if at all) based on whether those values make one more likely to be in a strangely "shaped" situation (reshaping the potential upsides and downsides of norm-breaking, not just uniformly raising the stakes across the whole distribution).
Yeah, that's possible. I think it's unusual to be in such an asymmetric (high upside / low downside from cheating) situation, and it's important to pay attention to possible downsides (just look at all the broader reputational harm caused by SBF's fraud). But I'm not claiming that norm-breaking could *never* be rationally justified. Just that I think we should start from a very strong pro-social/co-operative disposition, and not be *easily* swayed into norm-breaking defection based just on very speculative/unreliable reasons for thinking oneself to be the rare exception to the rule.
I tend to agree. But my point that how often you ought to be swayed may depend on if you adopt radical hedonistic utilitarian values such as extreme concern for animals or the exchangeability of current people with "merely possible" people.
It might -- I don't find it immediately obvious either way. I'd mostly just clarify that it doesn't follow directly from the higher stakes, but more indirectly (if at all) based on whether those values make one more likely to be in a strangely "shaped" situation (reshaping the potential upsides and downsides of norm-breaking, not just uniformly raising the stakes across the whole distribution).