I'm generally suspicious of the "consequentializing" project insofar as it involves collapsing the distinction between consequentialism and deontology. I think the latter is a significant distinction!
Telic ethics (as in #2) is meant to be compatible with maintaining the traditional distinction. Roughly speaking, we might think of deontol…
I'm generally suspicious of the "consequentializing" project insofar as it involves collapsing the distinction between consequentialism and deontology. I think the latter is a significant distinction!
Telic ethics (as in #2) is meant to be compatible with maintaining the traditional distinction. Roughly speaking, we might think of deontologists as having some distinctively "deontologically"-flavoured fundamental goals (e.g. to avoid violating rights in each instance), whereas I think consequentialist goals are more apt to be characterized without essential reference to moral concepts (instead invoking broader normative concepts like that of well-being). That's not a strict analysis or anything, just a rough first pass.
I say a bit more about scalar ethics if you follow the 'Deontic Pluralism' link. I think it's (broadly speaking) the right way for consequentialists to go, at least insofar as our *reasons for action* are concerned. But attention to fittingness, and especially blameworthiness, can give us the resources to make some more "binary" distinctions. I just don't think we should focus *excessively* on the resulting deontic binary (as that minimal standard seems antithetical to the sort of moral ambition urged in #2).
I'm generally suspicious of the "consequentializing" project insofar as it involves collapsing the distinction between consequentialism and deontology. I think the latter is a significant distinction!
Telic ethics (as in #2) is meant to be compatible with maintaining the traditional distinction. Roughly speaking, we might think of deontologists as having some distinctively "deontologically"-flavoured fundamental goals (e.g. to avoid violating rights in each instance), whereas I think consequentialist goals are more apt to be characterized without essential reference to moral concepts (instead invoking broader normative concepts like that of well-being). That's not a strict analysis or anything, just a rough first pass.
I say a bit more about scalar ethics if you follow the 'Deontic Pluralism' link. I think it's (broadly speaking) the right way for consequentialists to go, at least insofar as our *reasons for action* are concerned. But attention to fittingness, and especially blameworthiness, can give us the resources to make some more "binary" distinctions. I just don't think we should focus *excessively* on the resulting deontic binary (as that minimal standard seems antithetical to the sort of moral ambition urged in #2).