I don't think your reply to Brennan & Freiman is that convincing. Sure, there are benefits to be had from engaging in moral philosophy, but it's not obvious that they outweigh the risk. On one side, we have Mill and Singer, but on the other side we have Karl Marx. And even an utilitarian can endorse risk aversion.
I don't think your reply to Brennan & Freiman is that convincing. Sure, there are benefits to be had from engaging in moral philosophy, but it's not obvious that they outweigh the risk. On one side, we have Mill and Singer, but on the other side we have Karl Marx. And even an utilitarian can endorse risk aversion.
Though, if I had to guess, I'd say that academic moral philosophy is net positive today, largely due to animal ethics. And I certainly I wouldn't trust any "philosophical IRB" to improve this.
B&F's argument starts from the premise "if you are likely to commit a significant moral error when performing an activity, then you should avoid performing that activity." I argued that the premise is false: whether to perform the activity instead depends on whether the benefits outweigh the risks. That's enough to show that their argument fails.
It's a further question whether the benefits in fact outweigh the risks. I think they do (as, it seems, do you), for the sorts of reasons mentioned in footnote 1. But skepticism about the tendency of reasoned argument to do more good than harm in the long run is not really the target of my post. (What would be the point in even trying to argue against such a view? One's interlocutor would presumably ignore all arguments as more likely to be harmful than helpful! It's an intellectual black hole.)
I don't think your reply to Brennan & Freiman is that convincing. Sure, there are benefits to be had from engaging in moral philosophy, but it's not obvious that they outweigh the risk. On one side, we have Mill and Singer, but on the other side we have Karl Marx. And even an utilitarian can endorse risk aversion.
Though, if I had to guess, I'd say that academic moral philosophy is net positive today, largely due to animal ethics. And I certainly I wouldn't trust any "philosophical IRB" to improve this.
B&F's argument starts from the premise "if you are likely to commit a significant moral error when performing an activity, then you should avoid performing that activity." I argued that the premise is false: whether to perform the activity instead depends on whether the benefits outweigh the risks. That's enough to show that their argument fails.
It's a further question whether the benefits in fact outweigh the risks. I think they do (as, it seems, do you), for the sorts of reasons mentioned in footnote 1. But skepticism about the tendency of reasoned argument to do more good than harm in the long run is not really the target of my post. (What would be the point in even trying to argue against such a view? One's interlocutor would presumably ignore all arguments as more likely to be harmful than helpful! It's an intellectual black hole.)