Great post, help me a lot in sorting my thoughts. I still have a question: is there a parallel existing between Parfit’s ideas concerning personal identity and his ideas concerning normative truth? Because in Parfit’s view, subject is reducible, and can be reduced to experimental relations. And at the end of this reduction,Parfit concludes that we should care more about the nature of experience and less on person. Can we compare this nature of experience to his normative truth? Because identity is descriptive can compare to the non-ontological of moral truth. Parfit thinks identity is descriptive and therefore non-substantive, he grants person with substantive moral status(otherwise, how could pure quantitative experience have any qualitative force and hence be somehow related to normative truth?)So in conclusion,I think my main confusion is, how can Parfit be a reductionist about personal identity and a non-naturalist at the same time?
Great post! Really enjoyed it. But I still don't really understand Parfit's claim that moral truths have no positive ontological implications. What makes 'murder is wrong' true if not that murder has the property of wrongness? And if murder has the property of wrongness, aren't we then committed to the existence of wrongness?
I share your puzzlement! I guess Parfit might turn your question around and ask what makes it the case that murder "has the property of wrongness" if not *that murder is wrong*? The truth of the proposition is more fundamental, on his understanding, than the property ascription. And perhaps that's not such a crazy way to go when dealing with abstract, necessary truths of this sort. (It's not as though there's a real possibility that murder might have had the property of rightness instead. So it's similarly hard to see how the property ascription could do much explanatory work here.) I think it's just very difficult to metaphysically explain philosophical truths!
(Parfit is happy to grant "the existence of wrongness" in a sense: he certainly thinks that there is such a property, at least in a cheap, "description-fitting" sense. He just doesn't think it comes with any ontological burden -- whatever that means.)
I think a more promising approach to the understanding the nature of normativity is the end-relational analysis in Stephen Finlay’s Confusion of Tongues, which I also discuss at http://jamesaitchison.co.uk. This may dissolve some of the mysteries that Parfit addresses in OWM Book VI. What do you think?
"*given* that X is worth pursuing, then Y is too. But a view on which there are only hypothetical imperatives is effectively a form of normative nihilism—no more productive than an irrigation system without any liquid to flow through it."
In other words: end-relational normativity would seem to be no normativity at all unless some ends are themselves (really, not merely relationally) normative.
Thank you for your comments, and apologies for my delayed response.
I see normativity as being about making judgments relative to criteria. This is supported by Stephen Finlay’s analyses of ‘good’ and other core normative words. Practical reason is then about considering how to act to achieve objectives that we chose. Choices of both ends and means are reasoned about. On this picture practical reason has a simple metaphysical and epistemic nature as human evaluations of relations between means and ends.
Does this analysis of mundane practical reason extend to morality, to Normativity with oomph? It seems unlikely that morality has a separate nature as morality has no clear boundary and moral judgements can be readily substituted by end-relational arguments. Practical reason is the broad domain of deciding how to act, within this morality is only a style of approach.
But, as you point out, as end-relational thinking must end somewhere, is this analysis ultimately subjective? My answer is that there may be subjectivity at a base rock level of human liking of enjoyment over suffering. But we can argue about ends above the base level, and also debate the details of the base. I don’t see this as nihilistic.
On this view, what's the difference between "Good relative to beneficent criteria" and "Good relative to Nazi criteria"? Seems like a problem if your view counts them as equally "normative".
I distinguish mundane normativity and moral Normativity. The first covers all value judgments which I believe are always made as evaluations against criteria. The word ‘good’ is used throughout mundane normativity and can be relativized to any criteria. We can speak of a good Nazi or a good thief. If I say ‘a good thief’ I make a formal, mundane normative judgment relative to the criterion of effectiveness at thieving but do not thereby endorse thieving.
Then there is Normativity in the moral sense. This can be an illusive concept. It may concern requirements about how to act that seem strongly required, that are supported by reactive attitudes, which may be directed towards the common good and which may be linked to religion.
I see practical reason as a process of reasoning about ends and means and thereby making better decisions about how to act. We have strong reasons to judge that ‘Good relevant to beneficent criteria’ is better than ‘Good relevant to Nazi criteria,’ because the former has the better ends. These reasons include Parfit‘s arguments for expanding the circle of concern.
But going back to my original point with Parfit, do you agree that mundane normativity has the end-relational nature suggested by Finlay that I outlined? And, if so, do you agree it is unlikely that moral Normativity has a radically different nature?
It's standard to distinguish substantive vs merely formal "normativity" (where the latter is relative to arbitrary criteria, and lacks "normative force"). I do indeed believe these are radically different things, and that it would be hopeless to try to account for the former in terms of the latter.
One may, of course, argue that it's "unlikely" that there is any substantive normativity -- that mundane end-relationalism is all there is. But that's precisely to argue for error theory/nihilism about (real) normativity.
Yes, I am making the standard distinction between formal, mundane, general normativity and special, moralistic, substantive, capital-N Normativity with motivational oomph. I found this discussion of the distinction particularly useful: https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/1292/docs/BeyondNorm.pdf
General normativity is essential as it underlies the vital practical reasoning used to navigate the world. Most practical evaluations by individuals, groups and governments are made by reasoning about ends and means without reference to substantive Normativity. Reasoning can lead to consequentialist or deontological views of how to act - Normative ethics can be done using just end-relational resources.
You suggest that a feature of substantive Normativity is normative force (meaning motivational force). Both Parfit and Singer argue that normative questions of what is good should be separated from questions of motivation – whether a belief gives us reasons to do something is a normative question, and whether it motivates us to do it is a psychological question. As in Singer’s example of thinking that normatively you should visit the dentist although you are not motivated to go, the concepts should be distinguished in deliberation. A concept of substantive Normativity that has motivation built into it is likely to confuse.
Do I think substantive Normativity is an error? Perhaps, but my point is more that general normativity and practical reason has a wide domain and substantive Normativity and morality is subsidiary to this. Further, general normativity, through reasoning about ends and means, has the resources to deal with traditional questions in morality, so the problematic substantive Normativity can be seen as optional. Philosophical ethics should start from practical reason, not morality.
Great post, help me a lot in sorting my thoughts. I still have a question: is there a parallel existing between Parfit’s ideas concerning personal identity and his ideas concerning normative truth? Because in Parfit’s view, subject is reducible, and can be reduced to experimental relations. And at the end of this reduction,Parfit concludes that we should care more about the nature of experience and less on person. Can we compare this nature of experience to his normative truth? Because identity is descriptive can compare to the non-ontological of moral truth. Parfit thinks identity is descriptive and therefore non-substantive, he grants person with substantive moral status(otherwise, how could pure quantitative experience have any qualitative force and hence be somehow related to normative truth?)So in conclusion,I think my main confusion is, how can Parfit be a reductionist about personal identity and a non-naturalist at the same time?
Great post! Really enjoyed it. But I still don't really understand Parfit's claim that moral truths have no positive ontological implications. What makes 'murder is wrong' true if not that murder has the property of wrongness? And if murder has the property of wrongness, aren't we then committed to the existence of wrongness?
I share your puzzlement! I guess Parfit might turn your question around and ask what makes it the case that murder "has the property of wrongness" if not *that murder is wrong*? The truth of the proposition is more fundamental, on his understanding, than the property ascription. And perhaps that's not such a crazy way to go when dealing with abstract, necessary truths of this sort. (It's not as though there's a real possibility that murder might have had the property of rightness instead. So it's similarly hard to see how the property ascription could do much explanatory work here.) I think it's just very difficult to metaphysically explain philosophical truths!
(Parfit is happy to grant "the existence of wrongness" in a sense: he certainly thinks that there is such a property, at least in a cheap, "description-fitting" sense. He just doesn't think it comes with any ontological burden -- whatever that means.)
That's helpful, thanks!
I think a more promising approach to the understanding the nature of normativity is the end-relational analysis in Stephen Finlay’s Confusion of Tongues, which I also discuss at http://jamesaitchison.co.uk. This may dissolve some of the mysteries that Parfit addresses in OWM Book VI. What do you think?
Seems like nihilism to me? Compare what I say about hypothetical imperatives as normative inheritance relations:
https://rychappell.substack.com/p/against-egoism-and-subjectivism
"*given* that X is worth pursuing, then Y is too. But a view on which there are only hypothetical imperatives is effectively a form of normative nihilism—no more productive than an irrigation system without any liquid to flow through it."
In other words: end-relational normativity would seem to be no normativity at all unless some ends are themselves (really, not merely relationally) normative.
See also my critique of Maguire & Woods' related view, here: https://www.philosophyetc.net/2021/05/why-belief-is-no-game.html
Thank you for your comments, and apologies for my delayed response.
I see normativity as being about making judgments relative to criteria. This is supported by Stephen Finlay’s analyses of ‘good’ and other core normative words. Practical reason is then about considering how to act to achieve objectives that we chose. Choices of both ends and means are reasoned about. On this picture practical reason has a simple metaphysical and epistemic nature as human evaluations of relations between means and ends.
Does this analysis of mundane practical reason extend to morality, to Normativity with oomph? It seems unlikely that morality has a separate nature as morality has no clear boundary and moral judgements can be readily substituted by end-relational arguments. Practical reason is the broad domain of deciding how to act, within this morality is only a style of approach.
But, as you point out, as end-relational thinking must end somewhere, is this analysis ultimately subjective? My answer is that there may be subjectivity at a base rock level of human liking of enjoyment over suffering. But we can argue about ends above the base level, and also debate the details of the base. I don’t see this as nihilistic.
On this view, what's the difference between "Good relative to beneficent criteria" and "Good relative to Nazi criteria"? Seems like a problem if your view counts them as equally "normative".
I distinguish mundane normativity and moral Normativity. The first covers all value judgments which I believe are always made as evaluations against criteria. The word ‘good’ is used throughout mundane normativity and can be relativized to any criteria. We can speak of a good Nazi or a good thief. If I say ‘a good thief’ I make a formal, mundane normative judgment relative to the criterion of effectiveness at thieving but do not thereby endorse thieving.
Then there is Normativity in the moral sense. This can be an illusive concept. It may concern requirements about how to act that seem strongly required, that are supported by reactive attitudes, which may be directed towards the common good and which may be linked to religion.
I see practical reason as a process of reasoning about ends and means and thereby making better decisions about how to act. We have strong reasons to judge that ‘Good relevant to beneficent criteria’ is better than ‘Good relevant to Nazi criteria,’ because the former has the better ends. These reasons include Parfit‘s arguments for expanding the circle of concern.
But going back to my original point with Parfit, do you agree that mundane normativity has the end-relational nature suggested by Finlay that I outlined? And, if so, do you agree it is unlikely that moral Normativity has a radically different nature?
It's standard to distinguish substantive vs merely formal "normativity" (where the latter is relative to arbitrary criteria, and lacks "normative force"). I do indeed believe these are radically different things, and that it would be hopeless to try to account for the former in terms of the latter.
One may, of course, argue that it's "unlikely" that there is any substantive normativity -- that mundane end-relationalism is all there is. But that's precisely to argue for error theory/nihilism about (real) normativity.
Yes, I am making the standard distinction between formal, mundane, general normativity and special, moralistic, substantive, capital-N Normativity with motivational oomph. I found this discussion of the distinction particularly useful: https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/1292/docs/BeyondNorm.pdf
General normativity is essential as it underlies the vital practical reasoning used to navigate the world. Most practical evaluations by individuals, groups and governments are made by reasoning about ends and means without reference to substantive Normativity. Reasoning can lead to consequentialist or deontological views of how to act - Normative ethics can be done using just end-relational resources.
You suggest that a feature of substantive Normativity is normative force (meaning motivational force). Both Parfit and Singer argue that normative questions of what is good should be separated from questions of motivation – whether a belief gives us reasons to do something is a normative question, and whether it motivates us to do it is a psychological question. As in Singer’s example of thinking that normatively you should visit the dentist although you are not motivated to go, the concepts should be distinguished in deliberation. A concept of substantive Normativity that has motivation built into it is likely to confuse.
Do I think substantive Normativity is an error? Perhaps, but my point is more that general normativity and practical reason has a wide domain and substantive Normativity and morality is subsidiary to this. Further, general normativity, through reasoning about ends and means, has the resources to deal with traditional questions in morality, so the problematic substantive Normativity can be seen as optional. Philosophical ethics should start from practical reason, not morality.