Chapter 3 takes a stab at fleshing out the concept some more. I'd say there are two main options: *conceptualism* treats metaphysical possibility as simply conceptual possibility in the subjunctive mood (given certain facts about what's actual). That should make more sense after Chapter 1's explanation of 2-D semantics.
Chapter 3 takes a stab at fleshing out the concept some more. I'd say there are two main options: *conceptualism* treats metaphysical possibility as simply conceptual possibility in the subjunctive mood (given certain facts about what's actual). That should make more sense after Chapter 1's explanation of 2-D semantics.
Alternatively, I try (in chp 3) to flesh out a more thoroughgoing *realism* about metaphysical possibility, linked to notions like objective chance and the open future, traced back through every past moment, to get a sense in which we might (if indeterminism is true) think the future *really could* have turned out differently if time were rewound and started anew. And then we can try applying that very concept to the initial starting conditions and laws of nature...
That sounds really interesting. I'm glad you take seriously the issue of how to precisely define metaphysical possibility. Some philosophers don't. Is the entire thesis available?
Chapter 3 takes a stab at fleshing out the concept some more. I'd say there are two main options: *conceptualism* treats metaphysical possibility as simply conceptual possibility in the subjunctive mood (given certain facts about what's actual). That should make more sense after Chapter 1's explanation of 2-D semantics.
Alternatively, I try (in chp 3) to flesh out a more thoroughgoing *realism* about metaphysical possibility, linked to notions like objective chance and the open future, traced back through every past moment, to get a sense in which we might (if indeterminism is true) think the future *really could* have turned out differently if time were rewound and started anew. And then we can try applying that very concept to the initial starting conditions and laws of nature...
That sounds really interesting. I'm glad you take seriously the issue of how to precisely define metaphysical possibility. Some philosophers don't. Is the entire thesis available?
Yes, I'll be posting the chapters individually over the next week or two.