I think one thing that might be worth noting is that paralysis worries plague non-consequentialist moral theories, as a result of unpredictable actions. Also, if the expected consequences of our actions are really so thoroughly swamped by unforeseen consequences, even the most extreme forms of moderate deontology will have the same result. If killing one affects the entire identity of the whole future, then moderate deontology will hold that its goodness or badness will be almost wholly independent of the wrongness of violating rights.
Yes, I actually just added a footnote on the paralysis argument (to the section discussing how cluelessness affects all moral theories) -- it isn't live yet, but will be in the next update.
I don't understand the paralysis argument. The motivating cases for the doing allowing distinction (from Foot) are that if five people are drowning over there and one person is drowning over yonder and you can only make it to one group in time, then you should save the five. In contrast with the case where you can only make it to five by running down the one blocking your path (and shouldn't). In the first case, you allow the one to die in order to save the five, but in the latter you kill the one in order to save the five. (And that's why the former is OK, but the latter isn't.)
As far as I can tell, Morgensen & MacAskill's view is that anything that results from something you do (something that sits on the doing side of the distinction) also counts as something you do. But that means that, contra the motivating case for the distinction, you do in fact "do" the harm to the one when you leave him in order to save the five. Why? Because saving the five is something you do, and the one's death is something that results from you doing it.
But no one who'd ever had any sympathy for the distinction would agree with an account of what it is to do harm that says you do harm to the one by instead rescuing the five. It gets the very first case completely wrong. So no one who likes the distinction would agree that anything that results from something you do counts as your doing it.
I also don't see how M&M could give some other account of doing that gets them all their downstream effects counting as doings without also getting that the death of the one similarly counting.
So it's a very puzzling argument. It's strongest form is perhaps to challenge the proponent of the distinction to give some cleaner account of it (§3.2 can be read in that vein). But one didn't need much argumentation for that: obviously that's a challenge the deontologist should accept. It's just a difficult question that they're working on. ("Working on.")
I think one thing that might be worth noting is that paralysis worries plague non-consequentialist moral theories, as a result of unpredictable actions. Also, if the expected consequences of our actions are really so thoroughly swamped by unforeseen consequences, even the most extreme forms of moderate deontology will have the same result. If killing one affects the entire identity of the whole future, then moderate deontology will hold that its goodness or badness will be almost wholly independent of the wrongness of violating rights.
Yes, I actually just added a footnote on the paralysis argument (to the section discussing how cluelessness affects all moral theories) -- it isn't live yet, but will be in the next update.
I don't understand the paralysis argument. The motivating cases for the doing allowing distinction (from Foot) are that if five people are drowning over there and one person is drowning over yonder and you can only make it to one group in time, then you should save the five. In contrast with the case where you can only make it to five by running down the one blocking your path (and shouldn't). In the first case, you allow the one to die in order to save the five, but in the latter you kill the one in order to save the five. (And that's why the former is OK, but the latter isn't.)
As far as I can tell, Morgensen & MacAskill's view is that anything that results from something you do (something that sits on the doing side of the distinction) also counts as something you do. But that means that, contra the motivating case for the distinction, you do in fact "do" the harm to the one when you leave him in order to save the five. Why? Because saving the five is something you do, and the one's death is something that results from you doing it.
But no one who'd ever had any sympathy for the distinction would agree with an account of what it is to do harm that says you do harm to the one by instead rescuing the five. It gets the very first case completely wrong. So no one who likes the distinction would agree that anything that results from something you do counts as your doing it.
I also don't see how M&M could give some other account of doing that gets them all their downstream effects counting as doings without also getting that the death of the one similarly counting.
So it's a very puzzling argument. It's strongest form is perhaps to challenge the proponent of the distinction to give some cleaner account of it (§3.2 can be read in that vein). But one didn't need much argumentation for that: obviously that's a challenge the deontologist should accept. It's just a difficult question that they're working on. ("Working on.")