Richard: Thanks for the post! As a general matter, I do think we should look for cheaper forms of deterrence all else being equal. In the last chapter of the book, I discuss a proposal by Mirko Bagaric and colleagues that hopes to release many incarcerated people to a system of surveillance outside of prison (involving audio and visual monitoring, along with use of a remote activated stun-device in the event of prohibited behavior). It seems like the plot of a bad movie, but to the extent it might actually reduce the harms of incarceration and allow people to lead more productive lives (with friends and family) outside of prison, it's worth some consideration, at least on a voluntary opt-in basis. We tend to think of incarceration as non-corporal punishment, but it still restricts freedom of motion and it certainly causes suffering (including the risk of uses of force like stun guns). If a surveillance proposal like this one can reduce incarceration (and its associated costs) while maintaining public safety and reducing the suffering of offenders and their loved ones, we can't just ignore it. And, of course, we must be alert to misuses of the technology and the risk that legislators over-rely on it in ways that increase total suffering.
Nonalt:
(1) You are correct. I focus on pure consequentialism that is "pure" in the sense that it denies the intrinsic value of retribution via desert. (Many of these ideas are spelled out in more detail in the book.)
(2) To the deontologists you describe, I would press them on their justification for collateral damage. I spend a good bit of time in chapter 5 arguing that even if retributivism could justify the intentional aspects of punishment, a full justification of some actual punishment must also address unintended but foreseen consequences (such as variable harms of depression and anxiety and risks of sexual assault, etc.).
(3) I'll have to reexamine the paper you reference, but as a general matter, I certainly believe there can be good consequentialist reasons for committing (with varying degrees of rigidity) to certain courses of behavior. Also, to the extent the "standard retributivists" I address are committed to some sort of consequentialist principles, a challenge to consequentialism would affect both theories.
Some questions for Adam: what are your thoughts on criminal justice reform? Should we be looking for "cheaper" forms of deterrence, like corporal punishment, in place of imprisonment in some (or many) cases? What do you think is the *weirdest* real-world implication of a consequentialist approach to punishment?
I see the debate as less deontology vs. consequentialism than pragmatism vs. wishful thinking. Perhaps that depends on whether deontologists hope that punishment can have a beneficial effect on rehabilitation or incentives, or simply intrinsically just.
A deontologist would be silly to resist reforms if incarceration could be shown to cause convicts to become more sophisticated, effective, and determined in their criminal activities once released (though maybe that means the existing system is a bit silly). Perhaps implicitly I am taking the consequentialist position, and echoing the post when it says that deontologists fall back on consequences when deontology is silent.
On pragmatic grounds, there are many criticisms to make of the existing system. How we respond to crime affects public safety, incentives of persons who have not been accused, restitution of victims, rehabilitation of criminal, etc. if we ignore the deontological aspects, it doesn’t seem to me to change anything.
If rehabilitation could be accomplished easily, say by an injection, then restitution of victims would be the only interesting variable left. And a deontologist could get behind trying to improve that as easily as a consequentialist.
"Consequentialists, by contrast, claim that if punishments like incarceration are justified, they are justified because they lead to good consequences, such as crime prevention and offender rehabilitation, that more than make up for the suffering and other bad consequences they inevitably cause."
Seems like he's working with a very narrow definition of consequentialism. Can't consequentialism allow for the value of retribution via desert?
2)
"Many find consequentialist punishment unappealing because it could lead, under some imaginable circumstances, to the punishment of the innocent, contrary to a firm deontological constraint that prohibits knowingly punishing in excess of desert."
Seems like that's mostly for left-wing deontologists. By contrast, right-wing deontologists don't typically have an issue with collateral damage as their foreign policy highlights in fiery colors.
3) Does he respond to the Bentham's Mugging issue about lack of commitment being exploitable?
Richard: Thanks for the post! As a general matter, I do think we should look for cheaper forms of deterrence all else being equal. In the last chapter of the book, I discuss a proposal by Mirko Bagaric and colleagues that hopes to release many incarcerated people to a system of surveillance outside of prison (involving audio and visual monitoring, along with use of a remote activated stun-device in the event of prohibited behavior). It seems like the plot of a bad movie, but to the extent it might actually reduce the harms of incarceration and allow people to lead more productive lives (with friends and family) outside of prison, it's worth some consideration, at least on a voluntary opt-in basis. We tend to think of incarceration as non-corporal punishment, but it still restricts freedom of motion and it certainly causes suffering (including the risk of uses of force like stun guns). If a surveillance proposal like this one can reduce incarceration (and its associated costs) while maintaining public safety and reducing the suffering of offenders and their loved ones, we can't just ignore it. And, of course, we must be alert to misuses of the technology and the risk that legislators over-rely on it in ways that increase total suffering.
Nonalt:
(1) You are correct. I focus on pure consequentialism that is "pure" in the sense that it denies the intrinsic value of retribution via desert. (Many of these ideas are spelled out in more detail in the book.)
(2) To the deontologists you describe, I would press them on their justification for collateral damage. I spend a good bit of time in chapter 5 arguing that even if retributivism could justify the intentional aspects of punishment, a full justification of some actual punishment must also address unintended but foreseen consequences (such as variable harms of depression and anxiety and risks of sexual assault, etc.).
(3) I'll have to reexamine the paper you reference, but as a general matter, I certainly believe there can be good consequentialist reasons for committing (with varying degrees of rigidity) to certain courses of behavior. Also, to the extent the "standard retributivists" I address are committed to some sort of consequentialist principles, a challenge to consequentialism would affect both theories.
Some questions for Adam: what are your thoughts on criminal justice reform? Should we be looking for "cheaper" forms of deterrence, like corporal punishment, in place of imprisonment in some (or many) cases? What do you think is the *weirdest* real-world implication of a consequentialist approach to punishment?
I see the debate as less deontology vs. consequentialism than pragmatism vs. wishful thinking. Perhaps that depends on whether deontologists hope that punishment can have a beneficial effect on rehabilitation or incentives, or simply intrinsically just.
A deontologist would be silly to resist reforms if incarceration could be shown to cause convicts to become more sophisticated, effective, and determined in their criminal activities once released (though maybe that means the existing system is a bit silly). Perhaps implicitly I am taking the consequentialist position, and echoing the post when it says that deontologists fall back on consequences when deontology is silent.
On pragmatic grounds, there are many criticisms to make of the existing system. How we respond to crime affects public safety, incentives of persons who have not been accused, restitution of victims, rehabilitation of criminal, etc. if we ignore the deontological aspects, it doesn’t seem to me to change anything.
If rehabilitation could be accomplished easily, say by an injection, then restitution of victims would be the only interesting variable left. And a deontologist could get behind trying to improve that as easily as a consequentialist.
Three points.
1)
"Consequentialists, by contrast, claim that if punishments like incarceration are justified, they are justified because they lead to good consequences, such as crime prevention and offender rehabilitation, that more than make up for the suffering and other bad consequences they inevitably cause."
Seems like he's working with a very narrow definition of consequentialism. Can't consequentialism allow for the value of retribution via desert?
2)
"Many find consequentialist punishment unappealing because it could lead, under some imaginable circumstances, to the punishment of the innocent, contrary to a firm deontological constraint that prohibits knowingly punishing in excess of desert."
Seems like that's mostly for left-wing deontologists. By contrast, right-wing deontologists don't typically have an issue with collateral damage as their foreign policy highlights in fiery colors.
3) Does he respond to the Bentham's Mugging issue about lack of commitment being exploitable?