Yes, and I just explained why it "isn't better". The claims about what reasons for action you have at the different times should not be confused with the claim that one of the actions results in a "better" outcome than the other.
Yes, and I just explained why it "isn't better". The claims about what reasons for action you have at the different times should not be confused with the claim that one of the actions results in a "better" outcome than the other.
Oh okay. But if we accept that your reasons come from the outcomes that you'd bring about -- which I'd think consequentialists would accept -- then that view would have to be rejected. Also, even if it's not better, wouldn't you have more reason to first create the person and then, after they exist, increase their well-being, rather than creating them with high well-being from the start?
No, you don't have reason to bring it about that you later act on strong reasons. Otherwise you'd have reason to put people into danger just so that you could rescue them from it!
You're right, that original objection of mine doesn't work.
But then wouldn't this have the implication that, if you make a person exist for one second, then your obligations to increase their well-being increase dramatically? Thus, if you could either increase the well-being of an existing person who has existed for one second and will only exist for one second absent you acting by 8 units or bring someone else into existence who will have 10 units of well-being, you should do the first? This seems implausible.
Seems plausible enough to me. In general, it seems we've somewhat more reason to benefit existing people than to create (and thereby benefit) new people. I don't know why it would matter how long the person has existed for. You can still imagine them looking at you, appalled, the complaint "You jerk!" just starting to form on their lips as they die in your arms because you figured you might as well replace them with someone else who would be marginally happier...
Yes, and I just explained why it "isn't better". The claims about what reasons for action you have at the different times should not be confused with the claim that one of the actions results in a "better" outcome than the other.
Oh okay. But if we accept that your reasons come from the outcomes that you'd bring about -- which I'd think consequentialists would accept -- then that view would have to be rejected. Also, even if it's not better, wouldn't you have more reason to first create the person and then, after they exist, increase their well-being, rather than creating them with high well-being from the start?
No, you don't have reason to bring it about that you later act on strong reasons. Otherwise you'd have reason to put people into danger just so that you could rescue them from it!
You're right, that original objection of mine doesn't work.
But then wouldn't this have the implication that, if you make a person exist for one second, then your obligations to increase their well-being increase dramatically? Thus, if you could either increase the well-being of an existing person who has existed for one second and will only exist for one second absent you acting by 8 units or bring someone else into existence who will have 10 units of well-being, you should do the first? This seems implausible.
Seems plausible enough to me. In general, it seems we've somewhat more reason to benefit existing people than to create (and thereby benefit) new people. I don't know why it would matter how long the person has existed for. You can still imagine them looking at you, appalled, the complaint "You jerk!" just starting to form on their lips as they die in your arms because you figured you might as well replace them with someone else who would be marginally happier...