<blockquote> proportionately fewer non-utilitarians seem to actually prioritize beneficence in this way.)<\blockquote>
Cite?
<blockquote> stuff like giving more to especially effective charities and otherwise seeking to improve the world with one’s marginal uses of time and money <\blockquote>
This description is distinct from utilitaria…
<blockquote> proportionately fewer non-utilitarians seem to actually prioritize beneficence in this way.)<\blockquote>
Cite?
<blockquote> stuff like giving more to especially effective charities and otherwise seeking to improve the world with one’s marginal uses of time and money <\blockquote>
This description is distinct from utilitarianism. While utilitarianism might (?) form a subset, it's not clear that this excludes any rival to utilitarianism. And if this is the critical distinction, perhaps we should create a new ism to distinguish this from its actual rivals. Maybe this is what you are doing with “beneficentism?” However, it seems a bit vague, and I would not be surprised if it turned out to depend very critically on undefined concepts like “effective” and “improve.”
<blockquote> on what moral view would you not want others to do more good? <\blockquote>
Perhaps fallibilism? If persons try to do good but are bad at it, they can make things worse. Stalin, Mao, and Hitler may have thought they were trying to do more good. Most people wish they hadn’t bothered.
<blockquote> proportionately fewer non-utilitarians seem to actually prioritize beneficence in this way.)<\blockquote>
Cite?
<blockquote> stuff like giving more to especially effective charities and otherwise seeking to improve the world with one’s marginal uses of time and money <\blockquote>
This description is distinct from utilitarianism. While utilitarianism might (?) form a subset, it's not clear that this excludes any rival to utilitarianism. And if this is the critical distinction, perhaps we should create a new ism to distinguish this from its actual rivals. Maybe this is what you are doing with “beneficentism?” However, it seems a bit vague, and I would not be surprised if it turned out to depend very critically on undefined concepts like “effective” and “improve.”
<blockquote> on what moral view would you not want others to do more good? <\blockquote>
Perhaps fallibilism? If persons try to do good but are bad at it, they can make things worse. Stalin, Mao, and Hitler may have thought they were trying to do more good. Most people wish they hadn’t bothered.