To what extent do your arguments here depend on some form of metaethical realism/objectivism regarding "importance"/"what matters"/"what is ultimately worth caring about"?
If there is no (knowable) fact of the matter concerning "what is ultimately worth caring about," but only facts such as "what I do care about" and "what I can reasonabl…
To what extent do your arguments here depend on some form of metaethical realism/objectivism regarding "importance"/"what matters"/"what is ultimately worth caring about"?
If there is no (knowable) fact of the matter concerning "what is ultimately worth caring about," but only facts such as "what I do care about" and "what I can reasonably expect others to care about," then certain non-consequentialist ideas (e.g. agent-relativity, supererogation) become much more plausible.
In particular, I would regard impermissibilty and supererogation, which you here treat with suspicion as signs of moral laxity, as intiuitively familiar and potentially useful concepts for mapping the treacherous moral terrain between the regions of what I care about, what I can reasonably expect others to care about, and what others can reasonably expect me to care about.
I don't think the realism/anti-realism distinction makes much difference to my view here. (Aside: note that you're sneaking in the normative term "reasonably" -- are you a realist about that one?)
I agree that impermissibility and supererogation are "familiar and potentially useful concepts" -- see 'Deontic Pluralism': https://rychappell.substack.com/p/deontic-pluralism -- I just don't think they should be our *central* moral concern. I'd still hold this view if I were an expressivist rather than a robust realist.
>"I just don't think they should be our *central* moral concern."
Fair enough on the last point. I fully agree that impermissibility and supererogation are better off living within a diverse ecosystem of moral concepts rather than propagated as monocultures.
>"I don't think the realism/anti-realism distinction makes much difference to my view here."
Really? Perhaps not in relation to the critique of deontology, but the following claims, for example, seem to lose much of their force if there are no objective facts about "importance":
- "Ideally, our actions should be guided by what’s truly important."
- "In a conflict between what’s important and anything else (e.g. deontic status), the former clearly wins out."
(Incidentally, I think the way you have written your final section somewhat undermines your claims about the theory-neutrality of "importance" by using an example that assumes utilitarianism gives the correct account of what is important. Shouldn't you at least include the flipped deontologist's version for comparison? ["Perhaps when considering the Trolley Footbridge case, it seems bad to allow five to die, but it seems more important not to kill the one. In a conflict between what’s important and anything else (e.g. saving lives), the former clearly wins out."])
>sneaking in the normative term "reasonably"
I don't think my talking about reasonableness here implies any particular realist commitments. I have expectations about what people care about based on my experience of interacting with them (e.g. trying to persuade them to care about certain things, and having them try to persuade me to care about others). In this context, a "reasonable expectation" is just one that accurately models the psychology and social norms of an imagined community of moral discourse.
To what extent do your arguments here depend on some form of metaethical realism/objectivism regarding "importance"/"what matters"/"what is ultimately worth caring about"?
If there is no (knowable) fact of the matter concerning "what is ultimately worth caring about," but only facts such as "what I do care about" and "what I can reasonably expect others to care about," then certain non-consequentialist ideas (e.g. agent-relativity, supererogation) become much more plausible.
In particular, I would regard impermissibilty and supererogation, which you here treat with suspicion as signs of moral laxity, as intiuitively familiar and potentially useful concepts for mapping the treacherous moral terrain between the regions of what I care about, what I can reasonably expect others to care about, and what others can reasonably expect me to care about.
I don't think the realism/anti-realism distinction makes much difference to my view here. (Aside: note that you're sneaking in the normative term "reasonably" -- are you a realist about that one?)
I agree that impermissibility and supererogation are "familiar and potentially useful concepts" -- see 'Deontic Pluralism': https://rychappell.substack.com/p/deontic-pluralism -- I just don't think they should be our *central* moral concern. I'd still hold this view if I were an expressivist rather than a robust realist.
>"I just don't think they should be our *central* moral concern."
Fair enough on the last point. I fully agree that impermissibility and supererogation are better off living within a diverse ecosystem of moral concepts rather than propagated as monocultures.
>"I don't think the realism/anti-realism distinction makes much difference to my view here."
Really? Perhaps not in relation to the critique of deontology, but the following claims, for example, seem to lose much of their force if there are no objective facts about "importance":
- "Ideally, our actions should be guided by what’s truly important."
- "In a conflict between what’s important and anything else (e.g. deontic status), the former clearly wins out."
(Incidentally, I think the way you have written your final section somewhat undermines your claims about the theory-neutrality of "importance" by using an example that assumes utilitarianism gives the correct account of what is important. Shouldn't you at least include the flipped deontologist's version for comparison? ["Perhaps when considering the Trolley Footbridge case, it seems bad to allow five to die, but it seems more important not to kill the one. In a conflict between what’s important and anything else (e.g. saving lives), the former clearly wins out."])
>sneaking in the normative term "reasonably"
I don't think my talking about reasonableness here implies any particular realist commitments. I have expectations about what people care about based on my experience of interacting with them (e.g. trying to persuade them to care about certain things, and having them try to persuade me to care about others). In this context, a "reasonable expectation" is just one that accurately models the psychology and social norms of an imagined community of moral discourse.