Well, things like the doing-allowing distinction and other themes from non-consequentialism (or, perhaps, agent relativity) are also also very intuitive in cases. Often it's when you try to induce them up to principles that they seem unintuitive.
Well, things like the doing-allowing distinction and other themes from non-consequentialism (or, perhaps, agent relativity) are also also very intuitive in cases. Often it's when you try to induce them up to principles that they seem unintuitive.
Very intuitive when assessing wrongness/permissibility in cases, or also when assessing what you've most reason to want (and to do)? I was thinking just the former. But always interesting to learn if others have different intuitions.
I'll have to reflect further on that, but I think I see what you're saying better now. I think some people will object that you are sneaking a concept of agent-neutrality into the concept of "importance", whereas they view importance as potentially agent-relative.
I think such an objection is made in James Dreier's "The Structure of Normative Theories" (Reproduced as the remainder of this comment):
"
We want to understand why, according to Sidgwick, the egoist is safe when hugging the тАЬoughtтАЭ judgment, but unstable when striking out to the тАЬGoodтАЭ judgment. I think we can find some guidance in the metaphor of objectivity. Thus, an тАЬoughtтАЭ judgment does not objectify. Saying тАЬI ought to pursue my own happinessтАЭ keeps my reasons securely inside me. But saying
тАЬMy own happiness is GoodтАЭ does objectify the value. It seems to place the value of, in this case, the EgoistтАЩs happiness, outside himself and in the happiness. Objectification suggests that the value is public, that it ought to be appreciable by anyone.
But, if this is in fact what Sidgwick was thinking (and I must emphasize that my reconstruction of his thought is highly speculative), then he was eliding two different kinds of objectivity. I used the term тАЬobjectiveтАЭ in the first place because I believe the kind I defined is sometimes confused with another kind. A value is objective in my sense, if it outreaches its own existence. But in the sense that Sidgwick would need, тАЬobjectiveтАЭ must mean something very like тАЬagent neutral.тАЭ It must mean something like, тАЬappreciable to anyone as a reason.тАЭ
Nice passage! I actually mean to leave open that importance may be agent-relative. (You could reasonably judge it more important to save your own child than to save two strangers, for example -- that's a perfectly reasonable-seeming pattern of concern.) But it would seem self-indulgent, IMO, to care more about maintaining "clean hands" than about saving lives. Cf. Nye, Plunkett & Ku in 'Non-Consequentialism Demystified' on how this would seem "monstrously narcissistic": https://www.philosophyetc.net/2015/02/thoughts-on-non-consequentialism.html
Well, things like the doing-allowing distinction and other themes from non-consequentialism (or, perhaps, agent relativity) are also also very intuitive in cases. Often it's when you try to induce them up to principles that they seem unintuitive.
Very intuitive when assessing wrongness/permissibility in cases, or also when assessing what you've most reason to want (and to do)? I was thinking just the former. But always interesting to learn if others have different intuitions.
I'll have to reflect further on that, but I think I see what you're saying better now. I think some people will object that you are sneaking a concept of agent-neutrality into the concept of "importance", whereas they view importance as potentially agent-relative.
I think such an objection is made in James Dreier's "The Structure of Normative Theories" (Reproduced as the remainder of this comment):
"
We want to understand why, according to Sidgwick, the egoist is safe when hugging the тАЬoughtтАЭ judgment, but unstable when striking out to the тАЬGoodтАЭ judgment. I think we can find some guidance in the metaphor of objectivity. Thus, an тАЬoughtтАЭ judgment does not objectify. Saying тАЬI ought to pursue my own happinessтАЭ keeps my reasons securely inside me. But saying
тАЬMy own happiness is GoodтАЭ does objectify the value. It seems to place the value of, in this case, the EgoistтАЩs happiness, outside himself and in the happiness. Objectification suggests that the value is public, that it ought to be appreciable by anyone.
But, if this is in fact what Sidgwick was thinking (and I must emphasize that my reconstruction of his thought is highly speculative), then he was eliding two different kinds of objectivity. I used the term тАЬobjectiveтАЭ in the first place because I believe the kind I defined is sometimes confused with another kind. A value is objective in my sense, if it outreaches its own existence. But in the sense that Sidgwick would need, тАЬobjectiveтАЭ must mean something very like тАЬagent neutral.тАЭ It must mean something like, тАЬappreciable to anyone as a reason.тАЭ
"
Nice passage! I actually mean to leave open that importance may be agent-relative. (You could reasonably judge it more important to save your own child than to save two strangers, for example -- that's a perfectly reasonable-seeming pattern of concern.) But it would seem self-indulgent, IMO, to care more about maintaining "clean hands" than about saving lives. Cf. Nye, Plunkett & Ku in 'Non-Consequentialism Demystified' on how this would seem "monstrously narcissistic": https://www.philosophyetc.net/2015/02/thoughts-on-non-consequentialism.html