"[T]he idea that utilitarianism is “counterintuitive” rests on interpreting it as addressing a primitive, indefinable sense of ‘wrongness’."
That might be one thing that makes utilitarianism look unintuitive, but there are lots of others. For example, its lack of sensitivity to how "close" someone is to you (e.g. your mom) is unintuitive …
"[T]he idea that utilitarianism is “counterintuitive” rests on interpreting it as addressing a primitive, indefinable sense of ‘wrongness’."
That might be one thing that makes utilitarianism look unintuitive, but there are lots of others. For example, its lack of sensitivity to how "close" someone is to you (e.g. your mom) is unintuitive in some ways especially in particular cases (if not at the level principles).
Lack of sensitivity to lots of other ethical ideas (see next sentence) also make it conflict strongly with a lot of intuitions we have in our lives. Such ideas include, desert, reciprocity, loyalty, non-betrayal, local egalitarianism, responsibility, honesty, sadistic pleasures, human supremacy, the importance of pre-existing value, authenticity, integrity. These ideas may sometimes seem unintuitive at the level of principles (debatable), but I think they are often highly unintuitive in real cases.
You can argue that these intuitions are outweighed by other ones, explained away, or sacrificed in the quest for a fully specified and parsimonious theory, but they do exist. And I don't see why a theory that accounted for these things couldn't adopt scalarism or whatever alternative to binary-deontic fundamentalism you suggest.
Yes, true, I should have written "consequentialism" there -- as there are certainly specific aspects of the utilitarian conception of the good that are intuitively questionable.
Well, things like the doing-allowing distinction and other themes from non-consequentialism (or, perhaps, agent relativity) are also also very intuitive in cases. Often it's when you try to induce them up to principles that they seem unintuitive.
Very intuitive when assessing wrongness/permissibility in cases, or also when assessing what you've most reason to want (and to do)? I was thinking just the former. But always interesting to learn if others have different intuitions.
I'll have to reflect further on that, but I think I see what you're saying better now. I think some people will object that you are sneaking a concept of agent-neutrality into the concept of "importance", whereas they view importance as potentially agent-relative.
I think such an objection is made in James Dreier's "The Structure of Normative Theories" (Reproduced as the remainder of this comment):
"
We want to understand why, according to Sidgwick, the egoist is safe when hugging the “ought” judgment, but unstable when striking out to the “Good” judgment. I think we can find some guidance in the metaphor of objectivity. Thus, an “ought” judgment does not objectify. Saying “I ought to pursue my own happiness” keeps my reasons securely inside me. But saying
“My own happiness is Good” does objectify the value. It seems to place the value of, in this case, the Egoist’s happiness, outside himself and in the happiness. Objectification suggests that the value is public, that it ought to be appreciable by anyone.
But, if this is in fact what Sidgwick was thinking (and I must emphasize that my reconstruction of his thought is highly speculative), then he was eliding two different kinds of objectivity. I used the term “objective” in the first place because I believe the kind I defined is sometimes confused with another kind. A value is objective in my sense, if it outreaches its own existence. But in the sense that Sidgwick would need, “objective” must mean something very like “agent neutral.” It must mean something like, “appreciable to anyone as a reason.”
Nice passage! I actually mean to leave open that importance may be agent-relative. (You could reasonably judge it more important to save your own child than to save two strangers, for example -- that's a perfectly reasonable-seeming pattern of concern.) But it would seem self-indulgent, IMO, to care more about maintaining "clean hands" than about saving lives. Cf. Nye, Plunkett & Ku in 'Non-Consequentialism Demystified' on how this would seem "monstrously narcissistic": https://www.philosophyetc.net/2015/02/thoughts-on-non-consequentialism.html
"[T]he idea that utilitarianism is “counterintuitive” rests on interpreting it as addressing a primitive, indefinable sense of ‘wrongness’."
That might be one thing that makes utilitarianism look unintuitive, but there are lots of others. For example, its lack of sensitivity to how "close" someone is to you (e.g. your mom) is unintuitive in some ways especially in particular cases (if not at the level principles).
Lack of sensitivity to lots of other ethical ideas (see next sentence) also make it conflict strongly with a lot of intuitions we have in our lives. Such ideas include, desert, reciprocity, loyalty, non-betrayal, local egalitarianism, responsibility, honesty, sadistic pleasures, human supremacy, the importance of pre-existing value, authenticity, integrity. These ideas may sometimes seem unintuitive at the level of principles (debatable), but I think they are often highly unintuitive in real cases.
You can argue that these intuitions are outweighed by other ones, explained away, or sacrificed in the quest for a fully specified and parsimonious theory, but they do exist. And I don't see why a theory that accounted for these things couldn't adopt scalarism or whatever alternative to binary-deontic fundamentalism you suggest.
Yes, true, I should have written "consequentialism" there -- as there are certainly specific aspects of the utilitarian conception of the good that are intuitively questionable.
Well, things like the doing-allowing distinction and other themes from non-consequentialism (or, perhaps, agent relativity) are also also very intuitive in cases. Often it's when you try to induce them up to principles that they seem unintuitive.
Very intuitive when assessing wrongness/permissibility in cases, or also when assessing what you've most reason to want (and to do)? I was thinking just the former. But always interesting to learn if others have different intuitions.
I'll have to reflect further on that, but I think I see what you're saying better now. I think some people will object that you are sneaking a concept of agent-neutrality into the concept of "importance", whereas they view importance as potentially agent-relative.
I think such an objection is made in James Dreier's "The Structure of Normative Theories" (Reproduced as the remainder of this comment):
"
We want to understand why, according to Sidgwick, the egoist is safe when hugging the “ought” judgment, but unstable when striking out to the “Good” judgment. I think we can find some guidance in the metaphor of objectivity. Thus, an “ought” judgment does not objectify. Saying “I ought to pursue my own happiness” keeps my reasons securely inside me. But saying
“My own happiness is Good” does objectify the value. It seems to place the value of, in this case, the Egoist’s happiness, outside himself and in the happiness. Objectification suggests that the value is public, that it ought to be appreciable by anyone.
But, if this is in fact what Sidgwick was thinking (and I must emphasize that my reconstruction of his thought is highly speculative), then he was eliding two different kinds of objectivity. I used the term “objective” in the first place because I believe the kind I defined is sometimes confused with another kind. A value is objective in my sense, if it outreaches its own existence. But in the sense that Sidgwick would need, “objective” must mean something very like “agent neutral.” It must mean something like, “appreciable to anyone as a reason.”
"
Nice passage! I actually mean to leave open that importance may be agent-relative. (You could reasonably judge it more important to save your own child than to save two strangers, for example -- that's a perfectly reasonable-seeming pattern of concern.) But it would seem self-indulgent, IMO, to care more about maintaining "clean hands" than about saving lives. Cf. Nye, Plunkett & Ku in 'Non-Consequentialism Demystified' on how this would seem "monstrously narcissistic": https://www.philosophyetc.net/2015/02/thoughts-on-non-consequentialism.html