The objection just seems to be that consequentialism yields unintuitive verdicts about permissibility. But I think no such objection has any force, because consequentialism (properly understood) isn't a theory of permissibility at all, as explained here: https://rychappell.substack.com/p/bleeding-heart-consequentialism#%C2%A7conclusion
That said, if I were to play the permissibility game (without appealing to deontic fictionalism or the like), I think my willpower satisficing account - https://philpapers.org/rec/CHASBE-4 - escapes their objection.
From fn 10 of their paper: "If Billy is permitted to donate only a certain amount, $X, could make a donation of $X+Y which would save several more lives than a donation of $X, but instead makes a donation which saves these additional lives but also somehow kills his rival, this is clearly impermissible, but will still fall above the satisficing line (which was met by a donation of just $X)."
But now ask: could Billy, at no greater expense of effort/willpower, save the additional lives without killing anyone? There are two possibilities: if YES, then that's what he's required to do, on my account. If NO, and assuming that he isn't required to try any harder than it takes to donate the $X, then the relevant question is just which of these two not-excessively-demanding options we should prefer. And I think we clearly should prefer that he saves more lives, even at the cost of his rival's (one) life. It's not like his rival is more important, in principle, than multiple other innocent people who will otherwise die. So I think that's a perfectly comfortable conclusion for the willpower satisficing consequentialist to endorse.
The objection just seems to be that consequentialism yields unintuitive verdicts about permissibility. But I think no such objection has any force, because consequentialism (properly understood) isn't a theory of permissibility at all, as explained here: https://rychappell.substack.com/p/bleeding-heart-consequentialism#%C2%A7conclusion
That said, if I were to play the permissibility game (without appealing to deontic fictionalism or the like), I think my willpower satisficing account - https://philpapers.org/rec/CHASBE-4 - escapes their objection.
From fn 10 of their paper: "If Billy is permitted to donate only a certain amount, $X, could make a donation of $X+Y which would save several more lives than a donation of $X, but instead makes a donation which saves these additional lives but also somehow kills his rival, this is clearly impermissible, but will still fall above the satisficing line (which was met by a donation of just $X)."
But now ask: could Billy, at no greater expense of effort/willpower, save the additional lives without killing anyone? There are two possibilities: if YES, then that's what he's required to do, on my account. If NO, and assuming that he isn't required to try any harder than it takes to donate the $X, then the relevant question is just which of these two not-excessively-demanding options we should prefer. And I think we clearly should prefer that he saves more lives, even at the cost of his rival's (one) life. It's not like his rival is more important, in principle, than multiple other innocent people who will otherwise die. So I think that's a perfectly comfortable conclusion for the willpower satisficing consequentialist to endorse.