Why should we think our notion of what constitutes moral progress won't age similarly to "The White Man's Burden," Manifest Destiny, or any of the other horribles of the last few centuries, other than hubris? Like a nature reserve, we should focus on not wrecking it without trying to garden.
Why should we think our notion of what constitutes moral progress won't age similarly to "The White Man's Burden," Manifest Destiny, or any of the other horribles of the last few centuries, other than hubris? Like a nature reserve, we should focus on not wrecking it without trying to garden.
I'm not sure what that means. If an asteroid is on track to wipe us out, does deflecting it count as "gardening", or could sitting back and doing nothing count as a form of "wrecking"?
In any case, I think a sensible degree of epistemic humility doesn't entail full-blown moral skepticism (as if we should be unsure whether to bother saving innocent lives), but just calls for things like (i) avoiding value lock-in, (ii) encouraging Millian "experiments in living", and (iii) preferring *robustly* good options (e.g. increase human knowledge and capacities) over morally *risky* ones (e.g. trapping humanity in experience machines). These are all standard longtermist ideas: https://rychappell.substack.com/p/review-of-what-we-owe-the-future#%C2%A7improving-values-and-institutions
Why should we think our notion of what constitutes moral progress won't age similarly to "The White Man's Burden," Manifest Destiny, or any of the other horribles of the last few centuries, other than hubris? Like a nature reserve, we should focus on not wrecking it without trying to garden.
I'm not sure what that means. If an asteroid is on track to wipe us out, does deflecting it count as "gardening", or could sitting back and doing nothing count as a form of "wrecking"?
In any case, I think a sensible degree of epistemic humility doesn't entail full-blown moral skepticism (as if we should be unsure whether to bother saving innocent lives), but just calls for things like (i) avoiding value lock-in, (ii) encouraging Millian "experiments in living", and (iii) preferring *robustly* good options (e.g. increase human knowledge and capacities) over morally *risky* ones (e.g. trapping humanity in experience machines). These are all standard longtermist ideas: https://rychappell.substack.com/p/review-of-what-we-owe-the-future#%C2%A7improving-values-and-institutions