Independent of one's buying into that particular metaphysical or ideological framework. As a test case, consider what it would make sense for a metaethical error theorist (who doesn't believe in any kind of objective morality) to care about. It would be perfectly comprehensible for a nihilist-in-theory to still share the utilitarian's concerns, and have generally beneficent concern for others in practice. That's a concern that can survive the loss of metaphysical underpinnings. By contrast, it would seem bizarre for an error theorist to share the concerns of the conservative sexual moralist, or (I suggest) the concerns of deontologists. Those seem like concerns that *depend* upon their metaphysical underpinnings to render them comprehensible.
Put another way, it seems like what I've called "moralized" reasons are in a sense *conditional* upon their being objectively morally correct. Whereas reasons of beneficence do not seem conditional in this way. (For example, I'd still endorse utilitarian norms even if I became an error theorist and ceased to believe in "morality" at all.)
What counts as an independent reason? What are arbitrary rules dependent upon?
Independent of one's buying into that particular metaphysical or ideological framework. As a test case, consider what it would make sense for a metaethical error theorist (who doesn't believe in any kind of objective morality) to care about. It would be perfectly comprehensible for a nihilist-in-theory to still share the utilitarian's concerns, and have generally beneficent concern for others in practice. That's a concern that can survive the loss of metaphysical underpinnings. By contrast, it would seem bizarre for an error theorist to share the concerns of the conservative sexual moralist, or (I suggest) the concerns of deontologists. Those seem like concerns that *depend* upon their metaphysical underpinnings to render them comprehensible.
Put another way, it seems like what I've called "moralized" reasons are in a sense *conditional* upon their being objectively morally correct. Whereas reasons of beneficence do not seem conditional in this way. (For example, I'd still endorse utilitarian norms even if I became an error theorist and ceased to believe in "morality" at all.)