I don't think examples you make have much to do with ethics as solutions/constraints (or you may say deontology/consequentialism); it seems those are just misguided ethical principles. E.g. none of those constraints are acceptable on libertarian views of ethics, as they unjustly restrict human freedom.
Neither do ethics based on constraints necessarily imply that the status quo is generally acceptable: taking animal rights into account, the status quo is horrifying and on-par with slave societies.
I didn't mean to suggest that the distinction maps neatly on to consequentialism vs deontology. In general, I think any serious ethical theory will end up on the "solutions" side of this divide. (It's not a coincidence that arch-Kantian Christine Korsgaard joined Peter Singer in signing the 1DaySooner open letter in favour of challenge trials.)
My target here is instead precisely the sort of widespread misguided (and unreflective) purity/constraints approach to ethics that seems to actually guide policy-makers in practice. But I agree it's possible to have a principled deontological view that avoids these problems! (As I note in the post itself, a constraint against killing should make deontologists oppose obstructions on life-saving medicine. But alas, that doesn't seem to be the way that constraints-based ethics is most commonly instantiated, outside of the philosophy seminar room!)
>But alas, that doesn't seem to be the way that constraints-based ethics is most commonly instantiated, outside of the philosophy seminar room
That doesn't mean solution-based approaches will be better in practice. After all, Stalin was a big fan of finding solutions! But I do agree that the view you're targeting is wrong.
Framing this as solutions vs. constraints seems odd. All the examples provided involve constraints, but some seem more acceptable (informed consent) than others (paternalistic elitism).
When people think of morality they are not always thinking of the same thing. The sort of commitments we have or obligations we feel differ when we are considering what we owe other individuals and when we are looking for solutions. Although these can come into conflict, I don’t think we can exclude either from the sphere of moral reasoning. Instead, we need to try to find a coherent generalization.
I often am reminded of Bernard Gert when reading this blog. Gert had some interesting ideas about the necessity of simple public rules, but combined with a mechanism for determining when to make exceptions to the rules - briefly, someone who has made or wishes to make an exception must do so publicly and defend their actions.
I don't think examples you make have much to do with ethics as solutions/constraints (or you may say deontology/consequentialism); it seems those are just misguided ethical principles. E.g. none of those constraints are acceptable on libertarian views of ethics, as they unjustly restrict human freedom.
Neither do ethics based on constraints necessarily imply that the status quo is generally acceptable: taking animal rights into account, the status quo is horrifying and on-par with slave societies.
I didn't mean to suggest that the distinction maps neatly on to consequentialism vs deontology. In general, I think any serious ethical theory will end up on the "solutions" side of this divide. (It's not a coincidence that arch-Kantian Christine Korsgaard joined Peter Singer in signing the 1DaySooner open letter in favour of challenge trials.)
My target here is instead precisely the sort of widespread misguided (and unreflective) purity/constraints approach to ethics that seems to actually guide policy-makers in practice. But I agree it's possible to have a principled deontological view that avoids these problems! (As I note in the post itself, a constraint against killing should make deontologists oppose obstructions on life-saving medicine. But alas, that doesn't seem to be the way that constraints-based ethics is most commonly instantiated, outside of the philosophy seminar room!)
>But alas, that doesn't seem to be the way that constraints-based ethics is most commonly instantiated, outside of the philosophy seminar room
That doesn't mean solution-based approaches will be better in practice. After all, Stalin was a big fan of finding solutions! But I do agree that the view you're targeting is wrong.
Framing this as solutions vs. constraints seems odd. All the examples provided involve constraints, but some seem more acceptable (informed consent) than others (paternalistic elitism).
When people think of morality they are not always thinking of the same thing. The sort of commitments we have or obligations we feel differ when we are considering what we owe other individuals and when we are looking for solutions. Although these can come into conflict, I don’t think we can exclude either from the sphere of moral reasoning. Instead, we need to try to find a coherent generalization.
I often am reminded of Bernard Gert when reading this blog. Gert had some interesting ideas about the necessity of simple public rules, but combined with a mechanism for determining when to make exceptions to the rules - briefly, someone who has made or wishes to make an exception must do so publicly and defend their actions.