Yep, fair summary! In general (including, e.g., external world skepticism) I don't think it's possible to present non-question-begging counterarguments against radical skepticism. We can just explain why we reject some of the skeptic's premises (as I do in response to Street earlier in the paper -- see especially my discussion of the "m…
Yep, fair summary! In general (including, e.g., external world skepticism) I don't think it's possible to present non-question-begging counterarguments against radical skepticism. We can just explain why we reject some of the skeptic's premises (as I do in response to Street earlier in the paper -- see especially my discussion of the "moral lottery"), and hence why we aren't ourselves committed to sharing their skepticism. For more on my generally anti-skeptical approach to philosophy, see: https://www.philosophyetc.net/2009/02/skepticism-rationality-and-default.html
> I think [anti-nihilism about positive value] is just wrong, quite independently of any metaethical disagreements
Fair enough! There I was just wanting to stress the point that you shouldn't let metaethical qualms prevent you from making full-blooded moral judgments.
> prematurely rejecting ideas...
Sure, no-one wants to do that. I'm very much a fallibilist, and think even our verdicts about which claims are crazy/disqualifying must always be held somewhat tentatively and open to revision. I'm always interested to read arguments for nihilism, solipsism, radical skepticism, or whatever. But still, in the meantime, I think it's right to treat the fact that a view implies nihilism (or whatever) as disqualifying, and so we should be prompted to rethink some distinctions in the way I propose in the OP. (It's fine if you have a different list of claims you currently regard as disqualifying.) After all, there are also downsides to being too indecisive or philosophically non-committal.
Regarding skepticism, I think Moorean responses fail pretty hard in the face of moral disagreement. It is as if I say "here is one hand, here is another," and my apparently good-faith interlocutor replys "I agree the first thing is a hand, but the second is obviously an octopus; but don't worry, you really do have another hand, it's right there!" [points at my shoe] — enough experiences of this type, would (and perhaps should?) push me towards skepticism concerning the existence and knowability of an external material world.
So, hooray for fallibilism! (But also: Boo for indecisiveness!)
Yep, fair summary! In general (including, e.g., external world skepticism) I don't think it's possible to present non-question-begging counterarguments against radical skepticism. We can just explain why we reject some of the skeptic's premises (as I do in response to Street earlier in the paper -- see especially my discussion of the "moral lottery"), and hence why we aren't ourselves committed to sharing their skepticism. For more on my generally anti-skeptical approach to philosophy, see: https://www.philosophyetc.net/2009/02/skepticism-rationality-and-default.html
> I think [anti-nihilism about positive value] is just wrong, quite independently of any metaethical disagreements
Fair enough! There I was just wanting to stress the point that you shouldn't let metaethical qualms prevent you from making full-blooded moral judgments.
> prematurely rejecting ideas...
Sure, no-one wants to do that. I'm very much a fallibilist, and think even our verdicts about which claims are crazy/disqualifying must always be held somewhat tentatively and open to revision. I'm always interested to read arguments for nihilism, solipsism, radical skepticism, or whatever. But still, in the meantime, I think it's right to treat the fact that a view implies nihilism (or whatever) as disqualifying, and so we should be prompted to rethink some distinctions in the way I propose in the OP. (It's fine if you have a different list of claims you currently regard as disqualifying.) After all, there are also downsides to being too indecisive or philosophically non-committal.
Regarding skepticism, I think Moorean responses fail pretty hard in the face of moral disagreement. It is as if I say "here is one hand, here is another," and my apparently good-faith interlocutor replys "I agree the first thing is a hand, but the second is obviously an octopus; but don't worry, you really do have another hand, it's right there!" [points at my shoe] — enough experiences of this type, would (and perhaps should?) push me towards skepticism concerning the existence and knowability of an external material world.
So, hooray for fallibilism! (But also: Boo for indecisiveness!)