The argument Quiop pointed to invoked the claim that there's no mental state that even *seems* good, phenomenologically speaking. That sounds to me a lot more like denying the existence of happiness as a mental state, than granting happiness (a good-seeming feeling) and merely denying that it has *objective* positive value. Though I cert…
The argument Quiop pointed to invoked the claim that there's no mental state that even *seems* good, phenomenologically speaking. That sounds to me a lot more like denying the existence of happiness as a mental state, than granting happiness (a good-seeming feeling) and merely denying that it has *objective* positive value. Though I certainly do think that both claims are bonkers, it's the specifically *phenomenological* argument that we're discussing here.
The argument Quiop pointed to invoked the claim that there's no mental state that even *seems* good, phenomenologically speaking. That sounds to me a lot more like denying the existence of happiness as a mental state, than granting happiness (a good-seeming feeling) and merely denying that it has *objective* positive value. Though I certainly do think that both claims are bonkers, it's the specifically *phenomenological* argument that we're discussing here.