Some very foundational disagreements about moral methodology and reasoning here! > "it just seems to me undeniable that the role that suffering and well-being should play in our theorizing has to be asymmetrical, even if only for reasons of uncertainty over definition" Uncertainty over definition doesn't entail uncertainty about whether …
Some very foundational disagreements about moral methodology and reasoning here!
> "it just seems to me undeniable that the role that suffering and well-being should play in our theorizing has to be asymmetrical, even if only for reasons of uncertainty over definition"
Uncertainty over definition doesn't entail uncertainty about whether the thing itself exists. And I'm here arguing against the "strong asymmetry" which claims that creating non-comparative goods counts for *nothing*. That's the view that lacks any basis. You could count goods for *less*, but that sort of "weak asymmetry" is a very different matter. That's compatible with my claim that we've every reason to recognize *some* positive reason to bring good lives into existence.
> "there is, to my intuition, no comparably obvious moral fact about goodness"
It's good to enjoy fun times spent with loved ones. That's at least as obvious as the badness of suffering. (Compare the common wisdom: "better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all.")
> "emotive appeals intended to short-circuit arguments"
Um, no. They *constitute* (enthymematic) arguments. Maybe you reject the premise, as anyone can of any argument. But vivid counterexamples, and highlighting (or disputing) the repugnance of a view's implications, are the life-blood of moral philosophy, not a "short circuit". Getting these things right is absolutely central to possessing moral insight.
> Finally, "disrespect" is an odd term of analysis to bring in here; I'm sure many deontologists object that the utilitarian denial of intrinsic rights is "disrespectful" to people, but I doubt that would bother you
Again, I couldn't disagree more. It's really important to value people correctly! "Disrespect" is the standard term for not properly valuing people. And I take *very* seriously the charge that utilitarianism is "disrespectful" in this way -- I think it's a *much* more serious objection than superficial complaints about its extensional verdicts, because it gets much more to the heart of things. That's why I wrote 'Value Receptacles' - https://philpapers.org/rec/CHAVR - and also 'The Mere Means Objection': https://www.utilitarianism.net/objections-to-utilitarianism/mere-means/
Some very foundational disagreements about moral methodology and reasoning here!
> "it just seems to me undeniable that the role that suffering and well-being should play in our theorizing has to be asymmetrical, even if only for reasons of uncertainty over definition"
Uncertainty over definition doesn't entail uncertainty about whether the thing itself exists. And I'm here arguing against the "strong asymmetry" which claims that creating non-comparative goods counts for *nothing*. That's the view that lacks any basis. You could count goods for *less*, but that sort of "weak asymmetry" is a very different matter. That's compatible with my claim that we've every reason to recognize *some* positive reason to bring good lives into existence.
> "there is, to my intuition, no comparably obvious moral fact about goodness"
It's good to enjoy fun times spent with loved ones. That's at least as obvious as the badness of suffering. (Compare the common wisdom: "better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all.")
> "emotive appeals intended to short-circuit arguments"
Um, no. They *constitute* (enthymematic) arguments. Maybe you reject the premise, as anyone can of any argument. But vivid counterexamples, and highlighting (or disputing) the repugnance of a view's implications, are the life-blood of moral philosophy, not a "short circuit". Getting these things right is absolutely central to possessing moral insight.
> Finally, "disrespect" is an odd term of analysis to bring in here; I'm sure many deontologists object that the utilitarian denial of intrinsic rights is "disrespectful" to people, but I doubt that would bother you
Again, I couldn't disagree more. It's really important to value people correctly! "Disrespect" is the standard term for not properly valuing people. And I take *very* seriously the charge that utilitarianism is "disrespectful" in this way -- I think it's a *much* more serious objection than superficial complaints about its extensional verdicts, because it gets much more to the heart of things. That's why I wrote 'Value Receptacles' - https://philpapers.org/rec/CHAVR - and also 'The Mere Means Objection': https://www.utilitarianism.net/objections-to-utilitarianism/mere-means/