>> "Note that there is (as far as I’m aware) no philosophical basis for then denying the same reasoning as applied to non-comparative goods. A happy existence is clearly non-comparatively good for the person who enjoys it." I don't know about _denying_ the reasoning for non-comparative goods, but I think there really is an asymmetry betw…
>> "Note that there is (as far as I’m aware) no philosophical basis for then denying the same reasoning as applied to non-comparative goods. A happy existence is clearly non-comparatively good for the person who enjoys it."
I don't know about _denying_ the reasoning for non-comparative goods, but I think there really is an asymmetry between harms and goods, which is that the badness of suffering is surely the most undeniable moral fact we know; there is, to my intuition, no comparably obvious moral fact about goodness. Even though I _have_ a happy existence, I am much less certain when I introspect on the matter that this constitutes some non-comparative good--I honestly cannot tell you that I feel benefitted by my reasonably happy existence. But I am as certain as I am about anything at all, that if I were to be tortured for 100 years, that would be bad, and that I would be harmed by such an existence. I just genuinely, truly, feel orders of magnitude more confident drawing conclusions based on the badness of suffering than on the goodness of well-being.
The above is compounded by the fact that there is _much_ more disagreement as to what even constitutes well-being than what constitutes suffering--it just seems to me undeniable that the role that suffering and well-being should play in our theorizing has to be asymmetrical, even if only for reasons of uncertainty over definition.
>> "denying that our kids are better than nothing, or that utopia is better than a barren rock"
>>"It’s deeply disrespectful to deny that another person (who is, themselves, happy to exist) is better than nothing."
FWIW, I don't feel disrespected by the denial that I am better than nothing, despite being currently happy with my existence. I think some of the claims you make along these lines in the article undermine the argument: they feel like emotive appeals intended to short-circuit arguments. Further, it seems to me that most of the disagreement comes down to intuitions about non-existence and how it should be valued relative to happy existence, so these emotive appeals simply end up reading as rather strident restatements of your intuitions on the matter (to me, at least, who doesn't share these intuitions). Finally, "disrespect" is an odd term of analysis to bring in here; I'm sure many deontologists object that the utilitarian denial of intrinsic rights is "disrespectful" to people, but I doubt that would bother you (nor should it, in my opinion).
>> "But the wrong view here could easily motivate anti-natalist “voluntary human extinction”, which would be literally the worst thing ever. It’s really worth not making mistakes that astronomically great."
I think the second sentence supplies a resolution to the first that takes a lot of the sting out of this argument as a criticism of the asymmetry: I presume much of what makes human extinction the worst thing ever is that it is _irrevocable_ in a way that almost no other decision can be--so under conditions of moral uncertainty, even theories that say that voluntary extinction is okay should be extremely unwilling to endorse it in practice.
Some very foundational disagreements about moral methodology and reasoning here!
> "it just seems to me undeniable that the role that suffering and well-being should play in our theorizing has to be asymmetrical, even if only for reasons of uncertainty over definition"
Uncertainty over definition doesn't entail uncertainty about whether the thing itself exists. And I'm here arguing against the "strong asymmetry" which claims that creating non-comparative goods counts for *nothing*. That's the view that lacks any basis. You could count goods for *less*, but that sort of "weak asymmetry" is a very different matter. That's compatible with my claim that we've every reason to recognize *some* positive reason to bring good lives into existence.
> "there is, to my intuition, no comparably obvious moral fact about goodness"
It's good to enjoy fun times spent with loved ones. That's at least as obvious as the badness of suffering. (Compare the common wisdom: "better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all.")
> "emotive appeals intended to short-circuit arguments"
Um, no. They *constitute* (enthymematic) arguments. Maybe you reject the premise, as anyone can of any argument. But vivid counterexamples, and highlighting (or disputing) the repugnance of a view's implications, are the life-blood of moral philosophy, not a "short circuit". Getting these things right is absolutely central to possessing moral insight.
> Finally, "disrespect" is an odd term of analysis to bring in here; I'm sure many deontologists object that the utilitarian denial of intrinsic rights is "disrespectful" to people, but I doubt that would bother you
Again, I couldn't disagree more. It's really important to value people correctly! "Disrespect" is the standard term for not properly valuing people. And I take *very* seriously the charge that utilitarianism is "disrespectful" in this way -- I think it's a *much* more serious objection than superficial complaints about its extensional verdicts, because it gets much more to the heart of things. That's why I wrote 'Value Receptacles' - https://philpapers.org/rec/CHAVR - and also 'The Mere Means Objection': https://www.utilitarianism.net/objections-to-utilitarianism/mere-means/
>> "Note that there is (as far as I’m aware) no philosophical basis for then denying the same reasoning as applied to non-comparative goods. A happy existence is clearly non-comparatively good for the person who enjoys it."
I don't know about _denying_ the reasoning for non-comparative goods, but I think there really is an asymmetry between harms and goods, which is that the badness of suffering is surely the most undeniable moral fact we know; there is, to my intuition, no comparably obvious moral fact about goodness. Even though I _have_ a happy existence, I am much less certain when I introspect on the matter that this constitutes some non-comparative good--I honestly cannot tell you that I feel benefitted by my reasonably happy existence. But I am as certain as I am about anything at all, that if I were to be tortured for 100 years, that would be bad, and that I would be harmed by such an existence. I just genuinely, truly, feel orders of magnitude more confident drawing conclusions based on the badness of suffering than on the goodness of well-being.
The above is compounded by the fact that there is _much_ more disagreement as to what even constitutes well-being than what constitutes suffering--it just seems to me undeniable that the role that suffering and well-being should play in our theorizing has to be asymmetrical, even if only for reasons of uncertainty over definition.
>> "denying that our kids are better than nothing, or that utopia is better than a barren rock"
>>"It’s deeply disrespectful to deny that another person (who is, themselves, happy to exist) is better than nothing."
FWIW, I don't feel disrespected by the denial that I am better than nothing, despite being currently happy with my existence. I think some of the claims you make along these lines in the article undermine the argument: they feel like emotive appeals intended to short-circuit arguments. Further, it seems to me that most of the disagreement comes down to intuitions about non-existence and how it should be valued relative to happy existence, so these emotive appeals simply end up reading as rather strident restatements of your intuitions on the matter (to me, at least, who doesn't share these intuitions). Finally, "disrespect" is an odd term of analysis to bring in here; I'm sure many deontologists object that the utilitarian denial of intrinsic rights is "disrespectful" to people, but I doubt that would bother you (nor should it, in my opinion).
>> "But the wrong view here could easily motivate anti-natalist “voluntary human extinction”, which would be literally the worst thing ever. It’s really worth not making mistakes that astronomically great."
I think the second sentence supplies a resolution to the first that takes a lot of the sting out of this argument as a criticism of the asymmetry: I presume much of what makes human extinction the worst thing ever is that it is _irrevocable_ in a way that almost no other decision can be--so under conditions of moral uncertainty, even theories that say that voluntary extinction is okay should be extremely unwilling to endorse it in practice.
Some very foundational disagreements about moral methodology and reasoning here!
> "it just seems to me undeniable that the role that suffering and well-being should play in our theorizing has to be asymmetrical, even if only for reasons of uncertainty over definition"
Uncertainty over definition doesn't entail uncertainty about whether the thing itself exists. And I'm here arguing against the "strong asymmetry" which claims that creating non-comparative goods counts for *nothing*. That's the view that lacks any basis. You could count goods for *less*, but that sort of "weak asymmetry" is a very different matter. That's compatible with my claim that we've every reason to recognize *some* positive reason to bring good lives into existence.
> "there is, to my intuition, no comparably obvious moral fact about goodness"
It's good to enjoy fun times spent with loved ones. That's at least as obvious as the badness of suffering. (Compare the common wisdom: "better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all.")
> "emotive appeals intended to short-circuit arguments"
Um, no. They *constitute* (enthymematic) arguments. Maybe you reject the premise, as anyone can of any argument. But vivid counterexamples, and highlighting (or disputing) the repugnance of a view's implications, are the life-blood of moral philosophy, not a "short circuit". Getting these things right is absolutely central to possessing moral insight.
> Finally, "disrespect" is an odd term of analysis to bring in here; I'm sure many deontologists object that the utilitarian denial of intrinsic rights is "disrespectful" to people, but I doubt that would bother you
Again, I couldn't disagree more. It's really important to value people correctly! "Disrespect" is the standard term for not properly valuing people. And I take *very* seriously the charge that utilitarianism is "disrespectful" in this way -- I think it's a *much* more serious objection than superficial complaints about its extensional verdicts, because it gets much more to the heart of things. That's why I wrote 'Value Receptacles' - https://philpapers.org/rec/CHAVR - and also 'The Mere Means Objection': https://www.utilitarianism.net/objections-to-utilitarianism/mere-means/