Suppose that one can create Alice with ten utility or John with 5 utility. It wouldn't be wrong to trade Alice with ten utility for John with 5 utility (by trade I mean go from a state where one will create Alice to John). But then they can trade John with 5 utility for Alice with 5 utility--and neither action is impermissible.
Suppose that one can create Alice with ten utility or John with 5 utility. It wouldn't be wrong to trade Alice with ten utility for John with 5 utility (by trade I mean go from a state where one will create Alice to John). But then they can trade John with 5 utility for Alice with 5 utility--and neither action is impermissible.
On "wide" views, it precisely *would* be wrong to create John rather than Alice. It's permissible to create no extra life at all. But (on these views) if you do create, you need to do the best you can with it.
Okay this more complicated series of trades. You trade John with 10 utility for creating no one for creating Alice with 5 utility for creating no one for creating John with 5 utility. None of the choices is itself impermissible.
I take it there are no other procreative options at each time. I.e. at t1 you can either keep John (@10) or switch to no-one. You switch. At t2 you can keep no-one or switch to Alice, etc.
Raises interesting issues about diachronic consistency. E.g. if you foresee where you'll end up, then the original choice is wrong (you aren't really switching to "no one", but to John@5, while John@10 is an available alternative). If you can't foresee the future options, it's maybe not so obviously impermissible to get tripped up in this way. I expect there are standard things that defenders of intransitivity / cyclic preferences say about these sorts of situations...?
But this runs afoul of the following obvious principle which says that the fact that some act gives you extra options doesn't count against it. So switching at t1, on this account, is wrong only because you'll get extra choices, but that's obviously crazy. You shouldn't think "oh no, this action gives me extra options! I won't take it then."
Suppose that one can create Alice with ten utility or John with 5 utility. It wouldn't be wrong to trade Alice with ten utility for John with 5 utility (by trade I mean go from a state where one will create Alice to John). But then they can trade John with 5 utility for Alice with 5 utility--and neither action is impermissible.
On "wide" views, it precisely *would* be wrong to create John rather than Alice. It's permissible to create no extra life at all. But (on these views) if you do create, you need to do the best you can with it.
Okay this more complicated series of trades. You trade John with 10 utility for creating no one for creating Alice with 5 utility for creating no one for creating John with 5 utility. None of the choices is itself impermissible.
I take it there are no other procreative options at each time. I.e. at t1 you can either keep John (@10) or switch to no-one. You switch. At t2 you can keep no-one or switch to Alice, etc.
Raises interesting issues about diachronic consistency. E.g. if you foresee where you'll end up, then the original choice is wrong (you aren't really switching to "no one", but to John@5, while John@10 is an available alternative). If you can't foresee the future options, it's maybe not so obviously impermissible to get tripped up in this way. I expect there are standard things that defenders of intransitivity / cyclic preferences say about these sorts of situations...?
But this runs afoul of the following obvious principle which says that the fact that some act gives you extra options doesn't count against it. So switching at t1, on this account, is wrong only because you'll get extra choices, but that's obviously crazy. You shouldn't think "oh no, this action gives me extra options! I won't take it then."