Why the switch to "obligation"-talk? I take the pronatalist claim to just be that you have some *reason* to create each happy person (presumably in proportion to their welfare value). There's nothing paradoxical about that. Working through the putative asymmetry in outcome-relative weak actualism, let's take world B as a base and compare…
Why the switch to "obligation"-talk? I take the pronatalist claim to just be that you have some *reason* to create each happy person (presumably in proportion to their welfare value). There's nothing paradoxical about that.
Working through the putative asymmetry in outcome-relative weak actualism, let's take world B as a base and compare both world A, which adds Joy, and world C, which adds Misery.
From B's perspective, the worlds are all value-equivalent. A says A is better. C says C is worse. Suppose B is actual. Asymmetrists want to say (i) we had good reason not to realize C, but (ii) no extra reason to realize A. How do they secure this? Appeal to self-conditional value gives us reasons against C, in that if we'd chosen C, it would've then been worse. But it's equally true that, if we'd chosen A, it would've then been better, suggesting that we should have self-conditional reasons for A. (B doesn't regard itself as any better or worse than either A or C, and so doesn't generate any competing self-conditional reasons when making these comparisons.) Where's the asymmetry between A and C?
I think an asymmetry may have been smuggled in to the account of permissibility as "exactly those [options] that aren't [self-conditionally] worse than any other". If we instead start from the more foundational normative question of what *reasons* there are in the situation (and insofar as we go for deontic concepts like 'permissibility' at all, take it to be determined in suitable fashion by the balance of those normative reasons), there doesn't appear to be any grounds for an asymmetry here after all.
(Though again, I do think the deeper issue here is that we should reject "the spirit of actualism". Even if B is actual, we should regard the extra suffering life in alternative C as a bad-making feature, resulting in world C being properly evaluated as *worse*. There's nothing "spooky" about this; it's entirely commonsensical that we should evaluate miserable lives as intrinsically bad.)
I think an asymmetry may have been smuggled in to the account of permissibility as "exactly those [options] that aren't [self-conditionally] worse than any other". If we instead start from the more foundational normative question of what *reasons* there are in the situation (and insofar as we go for deontic concepts like 'permissibility' at all, take it to be determined in suitable fashion by the balance of those normative reasons), there doesn't appear to be any grounds for an asymmetry here after all."
How else would you weigh reasons so that you get symmetry (reasons to create good lives, and equally strong reasons against creating bad lives) in a way that's person-affecting and without requiring absolute value?
I think the asymmetry and maximizing self-conditional value can be justified on the basis of a stability/dominance/money pump argument. If C would happen, on Misery's account, A and B would have been better, and neither A nor B directs you back to C following self-conditional value. If you could, you'd pay to switch to A or B. Or, you would pay to shorten Misery's life to nothing and have the result look like B, but with an extra cost. However, if you would pay to go from C to A or B (or worlds close enough to them), choosing C first means getting money pumped in principle, and you should have just chosen A or B in the first place without the extra cost.
On the other hand, from A or B, self-conditional value doesn't direct you away, and there's no issue of dominance or money pumps on the basis of self-conditional value if you were to choose A or B. The value of A over B in A is other-conditional value from the perspective of B. Joy doesn't exist in B, so Joy has no account in B to consider or compel you from B towards A (or C). Self-conditional reasons in A only compel you to stick to A if you're already there.
Maybe we have other reasons to switch from B to A, but those don't come from B, so they don't seem like they could be actualist, person-affecting or merely comparative reasons.
There may also be stability/dominance/money pump arguments against actualism generally, so maybe that undermines this kind of argument, but I don't think it would completely defeat it.
In general, options that don't maximize self-conditional value seem unstable, in that they'll direct you away from them if you follow self-conditional value and they'll make you vulnerable to dominance or money pumps. On the other hand, any option that does maximize self-conditional value is stable, at least with respect to self-conditional value.
Why the switch to "obligation"-talk? I take the pronatalist claim to just be that you have some *reason* to create each happy person (presumably in proportion to their welfare value). There's nothing paradoxical about that.
Working through the putative asymmetry in outcome-relative weak actualism, let's take world B as a base and compare both world A, which adds Joy, and world C, which adds Misery.
From B's perspective, the worlds are all value-equivalent. A says A is better. C says C is worse. Suppose B is actual. Asymmetrists want to say (i) we had good reason not to realize C, but (ii) no extra reason to realize A. How do they secure this? Appeal to self-conditional value gives us reasons against C, in that if we'd chosen C, it would've then been worse. But it's equally true that, if we'd chosen A, it would've then been better, suggesting that we should have self-conditional reasons for A. (B doesn't regard itself as any better or worse than either A or C, and so doesn't generate any competing self-conditional reasons when making these comparisons.) Where's the asymmetry between A and C?
I think an asymmetry may have been smuggled in to the account of permissibility as "exactly those [options] that aren't [self-conditionally] worse than any other". If we instead start from the more foundational normative question of what *reasons* there are in the situation (and insofar as we go for deontic concepts like 'permissibility' at all, take it to be determined in suitable fashion by the balance of those normative reasons), there doesn't appear to be any grounds for an asymmetry here after all.
(Though again, I do think the deeper issue here is that we should reject "the spirit of actualism". Even if B is actual, we should regard the extra suffering life in alternative C as a bad-making feature, resulting in world C being properly evaluated as *worse*. There's nothing "spooky" about this; it's entirely commonsensical that we should evaluate miserable lives as intrinsically bad.)
"Where's the asymmetry between A and C?
I think an asymmetry may have been smuggled in to the account of permissibility as "exactly those [options] that aren't [self-conditionally] worse than any other". If we instead start from the more foundational normative question of what *reasons* there are in the situation (and insofar as we go for deontic concepts like 'permissibility' at all, take it to be determined in suitable fashion by the balance of those normative reasons), there doesn't appear to be any grounds for an asymmetry here after all."
How else would you weigh reasons so that you get symmetry (reasons to create good lives, and equally strong reasons against creating bad lives) in a way that's person-affecting and without requiring absolute value?
I think the asymmetry and maximizing self-conditional value can be justified on the basis of a stability/dominance/money pump argument. If C would happen, on Misery's account, A and B would have been better, and neither A nor B directs you back to C following self-conditional value. If you could, you'd pay to switch to A or B. Or, you would pay to shorten Misery's life to nothing and have the result look like B, but with an extra cost. However, if you would pay to go from C to A or B (or worlds close enough to them), choosing C first means getting money pumped in principle, and you should have just chosen A or B in the first place without the extra cost.
On the other hand, from A or B, self-conditional value doesn't direct you away, and there's no issue of dominance or money pumps on the basis of self-conditional value if you were to choose A or B. The value of A over B in A is other-conditional value from the perspective of B. Joy doesn't exist in B, so Joy has no account in B to consider or compel you from B towards A (or C). Self-conditional reasons in A only compel you to stick to A if you're already there.
Maybe we have other reasons to switch from B to A, but those don't come from B, so they don't seem like they could be actualist, person-affecting or merely comparative reasons.
There may also be stability/dominance/money pump arguments against actualism generally, so maybe that undermines this kind of argument, but I don't think it would completely defeat it.
In general, options that don't maximize self-conditional value seem unstable, in that they'll direct you away from them if you follow self-conditional value and they'll make you vulnerable to dominance or money pumps. On the other hand, any option that does maximize self-conditional value is stable, at least with respect to self-conditional value.