I don't think they *inevitably* imply this. Some ("wide") views hold that that different-number cases are *incomparable* in value (or "on a par"), while applying standard utilitarian axiology to same-number cases. But I guess they would probably at least imply that it's not bad to create X mediocre new lives, for trivial gains, rather than 2X different awesome lives.
I don't think they *inevitably* imply this. Some ("wide") views hold that that different-number cases are *incomparable* in value (or "on a par"), while applying standard utilitarian axiology to same-number cases. But I guess they would probably at least imply that it's not bad to create X mediocre new lives, for trivial gains, rather than 2X different awesome lives.
Suppose that one can create Alice with ten utility or John with 5 utility. It wouldn't be wrong to trade Alice with ten utility for John with 5 utility (by trade I mean go from a state where one will create Alice to John). But then they can trade John with 5 utility for Alice with 5 utility--and neither action is impermissible.
On "wide" views, it precisely *would* be wrong to create John rather than Alice. It's permissible to create no extra life at all. But (on these views) if you do create, you need to do the best you can with it.
Okay this more complicated series of trades. You trade John with 10 utility for creating no one for creating Alice with 5 utility for creating no one for creating John with 5 utility. None of the choices is itself impermissible.
I take it there are no other procreative options at each time. I.e. at t1 you can either keep John (@10) or switch to no-one. You switch. At t2 you can keep no-one or switch to Alice, etc.
Raises interesting issues about diachronic consistency. E.g. if you foresee where you'll end up, then the original choice is wrong (you aren't really switching to "no one", but to John@5, while John@10 is an available alternative). If you can't foresee the future options, it's maybe not so obviously impermissible to get tripped up in this way. I expect there are standard things that defenders of intransitivity / cyclic preferences say about these sorts of situations...?
But this runs afoul of the following obvious principle which says that the fact that some act gives you extra options doesn't count against it. So switching at t1, on this account, is wrong only because you'll get extra choices, but that's obviously crazy. You shouldn't think "oh no, this action gives me extra options! I won't take it then."
I think even your last point will depend on the particular view. I think most "wide" views, as I understand that term, would endorse the 2X awesome lives, because you get X times the difference between the average awesome life and the average mediocre life, which counts a lot, and the extra X awesome lives don't count against, assuming they're not worse than nothing (or if the awesome lives are bad, assuming they don't count much against, e.g. if the difference between an awesome life and a mediocre one is larger than the overall badness of an awesome life relative to nonexistence). I think Meacham's "Person-affecting views and saturating counterpart relations", Thomas, 2022's wide asymmetric views (both soft and hard), Frick's views and appropriately modified wide versions of actualism would endorse the 2X for these reasons, at least in a pairwise comparison. Even negative utilitarian views could endorse the 2X, assuming the 2X awesome lives have less bads in them than the X mediocre lives, but in principle awesome lives could have more bads than mediocre ones, even significantly more, as long as there are enough offsetting or outweighing goods.
I was assuming that the extra X lives would generate a lot of additional "incomparability" (as in Johan Gustafsson's discussions of "undistinguishedness"); but fair point that it may depend on the details of the view.
Gustafsson, J. (2020). Population axiology and the possibility of a fourth category of absolute value. Economics & Philosophy, 36: 81тАУ110. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267119000087
I don't think they *inevitably* imply this. Some ("wide") views hold that that different-number cases are *incomparable* in value (or "on a par"), while applying standard utilitarian axiology to same-number cases. But I guess they would probably at least imply that it's not bad to create X mediocre new lives, for trivial gains, rather than 2X different awesome lives.
Suppose that one can create Alice with ten utility or John with 5 utility. It wouldn't be wrong to trade Alice with ten utility for John with 5 utility (by trade I mean go from a state where one will create Alice to John). But then they can trade John with 5 utility for Alice with 5 utility--and neither action is impermissible.
On "wide" views, it precisely *would* be wrong to create John rather than Alice. It's permissible to create no extra life at all. But (on these views) if you do create, you need to do the best you can with it.
Okay this more complicated series of trades. You trade John with 10 utility for creating no one for creating Alice with 5 utility for creating no one for creating John with 5 utility. None of the choices is itself impermissible.
I take it there are no other procreative options at each time. I.e. at t1 you can either keep John (@10) or switch to no-one. You switch. At t2 you can keep no-one or switch to Alice, etc.
Raises interesting issues about diachronic consistency. E.g. if you foresee where you'll end up, then the original choice is wrong (you aren't really switching to "no one", but to John@5, while John@10 is an available alternative). If you can't foresee the future options, it's maybe not so obviously impermissible to get tripped up in this way. I expect there are standard things that defenders of intransitivity / cyclic preferences say about these sorts of situations...?
But this runs afoul of the following obvious principle which says that the fact that some act gives you extra options doesn't count against it. So switching at t1, on this account, is wrong only because you'll get extra choices, but that's obviously crazy. You shouldn't think "oh no, this action gives me extra options! I won't take it then."
I think even your last point will depend on the particular view. I think most "wide" views, as I understand that term, would endorse the 2X awesome lives, because you get X times the difference between the average awesome life and the average mediocre life, which counts a lot, and the extra X awesome lives don't count against, assuming they're not worse than nothing (or if the awesome lives are bad, assuming they don't count much against, e.g. if the difference between an awesome life and a mediocre one is larger than the overall badness of an awesome life relative to nonexistence). I think Meacham's "Person-affecting views and saturating counterpart relations", Thomas, 2022's wide asymmetric views (both soft and hard), Frick's views and appropriately modified wide versions of actualism would endorse the 2X for these reasons, at least in a pairwise comparison. Even negative utilitarian views could endorse the 2X, assuming the 2X awesome lives have less bads in them than the X mediocre lives, but in principle awesome lives could have more bads than mediocre ones, even significantly more, as long as there are enough offsetting or outweighing goods.
Thomas, T. (2022). The Asymmetry, Uncertainty, and the Long Term. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phpr.12927
I was assuming that the extra X lives would generate a lot of additional "incomparability" (as in Johan Gustafsson's discussions of "undistinguishedness"); but fair point that it may depend on the details of the view.
Gustafsson, J. (2020). Population axiology and the possibility of a fourth category of absolute value. Economics & Philosophy, 36: 81тАУ110. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267119000087