I'm certainly inclined to think that the overwhelming bulk of what's valuable about our lives is non-hedonic. Raw pleasure isn't *that* big of a deal. But it's really just bonkers to deny that there's *any such thing* as positive experience. I'm trying to imagine the response of ordinary people to your telling them, "On reflection, it do…
I'm certainly inclined to think that the overwhelming bulk of what's valuable about our lives is non-hedonic. Raw pleasure isn't *that* big of a deal. But it's really just bonkers to deny that there's *any such thing* as positive experience.
I'm trying to imagine the response of ordinary people to your telling them, "On reflection, it doesn't seem to me that there's any such thing as happiness or good feelings. Don't you agree?" Pretty similar to if you suggested that grass was purple, I imagine.
This is a sleight of hand. Vinding never denied the existence of happiness, he denied the existence of "positive value" from mental states like happiness. I know you probably also think that's bonkers, but it's quite obviously not in the ballpark of obvious absurdity as denying the existence of happiness as a mental state.
The argument Quiop pointed to invoked the claim that there's no mental state that even *seems* good, phenomenologically speaking. That sounds to me a lot more like denying the existence of happiness as a mental state, than granting happiness (a good-seeming feeling) and merely denying that it has *objective* positive value. Though I certainly do think that both claims are bonkers, it's the specifically *phenomenological* argument that we're discussing here.
If you're going around telling people that sort of thing, it helps if you wear special robes, or a silly hat, or something like that. They're much more likely to believe you that way.
I'm certainly inclined to think that the overwhelming bulk of what's valuable about our lives is non-hedonic. Raw pleasure isn't *that* big of a deal. But it's really just bonkers to deny that there's *any such thing* as positive experience.
I'm trying to imagine the response of ordinary people to your telling them, "On reflection, it doesn't seem to me that there's any such thing as happiness or good feelings. Don't you agree?" Pretty similar to if you suggested that grass was purple, I imagine.
This is a sleight of hand. Vinding never denied the existence of happiness, he denied the existence of "positive value" from mental states like happiness. I know you probably also think that's bonkers, but it's quite obviously not in the ballpark of obvious absurdity as denying the existence of happiness as a mental state.
The argument Quiop pointed to invoked the claim that there's no mental state that even *seems* good, phenomenologically speaking. That sounds to me a lot more like denying the existence of happiness as a mental state, than granting happiness (a good-seeming feeling) and merely denying that it has *objective* positive value. Though I certainly do think that both claims are bonkers, it's the specifically *phenomenological* argument that we're discussing here.
If you're going around telling people that sort of thing, it helps if you wear special robes, or a silly hat, or something like that. They're much more likely to believe you that way.