The premise that ‘general welfare matters immensely’ is at best trivial (tautology), since “welfare” implies “good/desirable/preferable/valuable/worth-pursuing”, and at worst is begging the question, insofar as some kind of personal judgment of what constitutes “welfare” is smuggled into the moral (social) equation. A non-trivial task wo…
The premise that ‘general welfare matters immensely’ is at best trivial (tautology), since “welfare” implies “good/desirable/preferable/valuable/worth-pursuing”, and at worst is begging the question, insofar as some kind of personal judgment of what constitutes “welfare” is smuggled into the moral (social) equation. A non-trivial task would be to prove that a particular idea of welfare is true/objective, contra any other conceptions of value. It does not suffice to posit that ‘everyone values something’ but rather what everybody ought to value THAT something, and then show what follows a priori from this premise in regard to our intentions. There can be no meaningful calculus of risks vs benefits or costs vs gains without first objectively grounding the value-system in which the calculus is performed, and thus overriding any subjective disagreements about values.
Moreover, for any moral/ethical principle to be motivating it MUST appeal, above all else, to self-interest
I don't think you can just define egoism out of existence like that. Welfare is what's worth pursuing *for an individual's sake*, INSOFAR as one has reason to care about this.
The "insofar as" marks an antecedent requirement that egoists can claim is not satisfied (hence we've no reason to pursue others' welfare). Many others may claim that it is only satisfied very weakly: we have little reason to care about others, on their view. My claim is that both of these (coherent and substantive) normative views are false: we have very strong reasons to care about what is worth pursuing *for others' sakes*.
I totally agree with your first point. As for your final point, there is a small caveat: There are other possible evolved motivational systems beside a narrow definition of self-interest, such as the preference kin-interest that make sense if we look at gene's survival point of view and also reciprocity that makes bigger units cooperation possible
The premise that ‘general welfare matters immensely’ is at best trivial (tautology), since “welfare” implies “good/desirable/preferable/valuable/worth-pursuing”, and at worst is begging the question, insofar as some kind of personal judgment of what constitutes “welfare” is smuggled into the moral (social) equation. A non-trivial task would be to prove that a particular idea of welfare is true/objective, contra any other conceptions of value. It does not suffice to posit that ‘everyone values something’ but rather what everybody ought to value THAT something, and then show what follows a priori from this premise in regard to our intentions. There can be no meaningful calculus of risks vs benefits or costs vs gains without first objectively grounding the value-system in which the calculus is performed, and thus overriding any subjective disagreements about values.
Moreover, for any moral/ethical principle to be motivating it MUST appeal, above all else, to self-interest
I don't think you can just define egoism out of existence like that. Welfare is what's worth pursuing *for an individual's sake*, INSOFAR as one has reason to care about this.
The "insofar as" marks an antecedent requirement that egoists can claim is not satisfied (hence we've no reason to pursue others' welfare). Many others may claim that it is only satisfied very weakly: we have little reason to care about others, on their view. My claim is that both of these (coherent and substantive) normative views are false: we have very strong reasons to care about what is worth pursuing *for others' sakes*.
I totally agree with your first point. As for your final point, there is a small caveat: There are other possible evolved motivational systems beside a narrow definition of self-interest, such as the preference kin-interest that make sense if we look at gene's survival point of view and also reciprocity that makes bigger units cooperation possible