That's about adopting a conception of rightness that fails to track normative reasons. (We still have an act consequentialist account of what we ought, in the reason-implying sense, to do; but then we use "right" in a way that tracks rule consequentialist verdicts -- or what an agent following a good decision procedure is likely to do --…
That's about adopting a conception of rightness that fails to track normative reasons. (We still have an act consequentialist account of what we ought, in the reason-implying sense, to do; but then we use "right" in a way that tracks rule consequentialist verdicts -- or what an agent following a good decision procedure is likely to do -- even though rule consequentialism doesn't ground real moral reasons or indicate the action that is objectively morally preferable.)
That's about adopting a conception of rightness that fails to track normative reasons. (We still have an act consequentialist account of what we ought, in the reason-implying sense, to do; but then we use "right" in a way that tracks rule consequentialist verdicts -- or what an agent following a good decision procedure is likely to do -- even though rule consequentialism doesn't ground real moral reasons or indicate the action that is objectively morally preferable.)