This all looks very interesting! I'm curious about this: "Deontic fictionalism, which adopts a rule-consequentialist criterion of rightness but denies it fundamental normative significance."
Is the criterion of rightness not fundamentally normatively significant because rightness isn't fundamentally normatively significant (because other …
This all looks very interesting! I'm curious about this: "Deontic fictionalism, which adopts a rule-consequentialist criterion of rightness but denies it fundamental normative significance."
Is the criterion of rightness not fundamentally normatively significant because rightness isn't fundamentally normatively significant (because other things like fittingness and value are equally or more normatively significant)? Or does "normatively significant" here mean "important for decision making"? Or does that statement about deontic fictionalism mean something else?
That's about adopting a conception of rightness that fails to track normative reasons. (We still have an act consequentialist account of what we ought, in the reason-implying sense, to do; but then we use "right" in a way that tracks rule consequentialist verdicts -- or what an agent following a good decision procedure is likely to do -- even though rule consequentialism doesn't ground real moral reasons or indicate the action that is objectively morally preferable.)
This all looks very interesting! I'm curious about this: "Deontic fictionalism, which adopts a rule-consequentialist criterion of rightness but denies it fundamental normative significance."
Is the criterion of rightness not fundamentally normatively significant because rightness isn't fundamentally normatively significant (because other things like fittingness and value are equally or more normatively significant)? Or does "normatively significant" here mean "important for decision making"? Or does that statement about deontic fictionalism mean something else?
That's about adopting a conception of rightness that fails to track normative reasons. (We still have an act consequentialist account of what we ought, in the reason-implying sense, to do; but then we use "right" in a way that tracks rule consequentialist verdicts -- or what an agent following a good decision procedure is likely to do -- even though rule consequentialism doesn't ground real moral reasons or indicate the action that is objectively morally preferable.)